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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER 
ARCHITECTS, P.C. a Utah 
Professional Corporation 
Petitioner and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Respondent and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 20000318-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from a district court decision granting a petition and dismissing 
a civil investigative demand issued to Appellee by the Attorney General in the course of 
an antitrust investigation. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, and PRESERVATION 
Is the Attorney General's objective evidence of an antitrust violation 
sufficient to enforce a civil investigative demand without showing that the CID 
recipient is violating the law and without being required to disclose confidential 
details of the investigation? 
The appellate court "will review the district court's decision for correctness while 
affording a 'measure of discretion' to that court in [its] application of the correctness 
standard to a given set of facts." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (citing 
State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 
(Utah 1994); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994)). 
The issue was preserved below {see R. 73-7'4; addendum E). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statutes, whose 
texts are reproduced in addendum A: 
15U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2(1997) 
15U.S.C.A. §57b-2(f)(1997) 
UTAH CONST, art. XII, § 20 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-201 (5)(a) (1997) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-304 (4), (9), (16), & (17) (1997) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-912 (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-914 (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-917 (1), (2), (7), & (8) (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-920 (l)(a) (1999) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. is one of many architectural firms assisting 
Utah public entities in constructing public buildings (R. 27-28,40,42; 84:24).' The 
1
 The transcript of the March 16, 2000 hearing before Judge Lewis is noted in the 
record as page 84, but only the cover page is included in the index. Citations to the 
hearing transcript will use the record page - 84 - and the numbers of the pages being cited 
in the transcript, e.g., 84:19. 
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duties of architects employed by public entities include writing specifications for door 
hardware to be installed in buildings being constructed (R. 32-33; 84:19, 30-32). 
The Attorney General began investigating a bid-rigging scheme based on 
allegations that door hardware specifications for public buildings being submitted by 
architects were written to favor the products of a particular manufacturer and sometimes 
required contractors to purchase door hardware only from certain high-margin distributors 
of that manufacturer (R. 23-25, 31, 35-39; 84:7, 19, 30, 32). 
Many Utah architects drafting door hardware specifications for public buildings 
utilize specification-writing services provided free by representatives of this manufacturer 
(who is one of the nation's largest door hardware manufacturers). Those specifications 
generally favor or require the use of only this manufacturer's products (R. 34; 84:19-20, 
24-26, 32-34). 
Brand-specific requirements placed in bid specifications ("no-substitution" bids) 
preclude the use of products from other manufacturers. When favorable "no-substitution" 
specifications are inserted into bids, this manufacturer raises the wholesale prices to its 
distributors to levels higher than on projects where bids are open to products from other 
manufacturers (R. 23, 35-39; 84:19, 20-21, 24, 26). 
In many cases, owners of the public buildings did not request, or even know of, bid 
restrictions (inserted by the architects) limiting which manufacturer's products could be 
used on a project or which distributors had to supply the products (R. 23, 33, 35; 84:7, 
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25). Architects working on state buildings are contractually required to get permission 
from the Utah Division of Facilities, Construction and Management (DFCM) before 
using any consultants to assist in preparing specifications and are expressly prohibited 
from using "sales" consultants affiliated with vendors (R. 58; 84:23-24). 
In the early part of its investigation, the Attorney General sent a letter to a number 
of architectural firms, including Brixen, in June 1999 asking for information about how 
Utah architects prepare door hardware specifications (R. 28, 40; 84:36). None of the 
firms receiving the letter responded or provided any information (R. 28, 40; 84:36). The 
Attorney General continued to gather information informally, interviewing the 
manufacturer's specification writers and distributors, school district officials, DFCM 
representatives, and architects (R. 27, 331-32, 84:13, 20-21, 31-33). 
In November 1999, civil investigative demands (CIDs) were issued to two Utah 
architectural firms. Information showing how these two firms used specification-writing 
consultants was analyzed and bidding documents they prepared were reviewed (R. 23, 32, 
84:13-14, 34-35). Additional CIDs were issued to 19 architectural firms in January 2000. 
These CIDs contained seven interrogatories designed to determine the extent to which 
these architects used manufacturers^ free specification-writing services when designing 
public buildings (R. 1, 4-9; 84:13, 35; addendum B). All the architectural firms 
responded to the CIDs, except Brixen (R. 28; 84:35). 
Brixen & Christopher Architects filed a petition on January 25, 2000 to set aside 
4 
the investigative demand (R. 1-3). After briefing by the parties and submission of 
affidavits (addendum C), a hearing was held before District Court Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
on March 16, 2000 (R. 72, 84:1-45; addendum D). 
The trial court agreed with the arguments made by Brixen in its memorandum and 
oral argument and signed a three-paragraph written order on March 28, 2000 granting the 
petition and dismissing the CID (R. 73-74; addendum E). Although the court did not 
explain the basis for its decision, the reasons can be gleaned from statements made by 
Judge Lewis during oral argument. It appears that the CID was dismissed (quashed) 
because the court concluded that the State: a) was required to demonstrate that the CID 
recipient was violating the law (R. 84:13, 14, 17, 26, 34); b) should not have notified 
Brixen that it was a target (R. 84:9-12, 35, 37-38, 43); c) should identify the sources of its 
information (R. 84:7-8, 13, 14, 31, 35); and d) demonstrated insufficient reasonable cause 
(R. 84:24, 38, 42-43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When a petitioner contests the issuance of an antitrust civil investigative demand 
(CID), the Attorney General must demonstrate to a trial court that the State's belief that a 
violation is occurring is a reasonable belief and must put forth some evidence in support 
of that belief. If this "reasonable cause" exists, the Attorney General is entitled to seek 
information from any party possessing relevant information. 
The trial court improperly imposed additional requirements on the State at the 
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hearing on Appellee's challenge to the investigative demand. The State should not be 
required to demonstrate illegal conduct by a recipient of a CID and should not be obliged 
to disclose confidential details of its investigation in order to have a CID enforced. 
Substantial evidence was presented to the trial court showing agreements between 
a manufacturer and architects to create restrictive bid specifications that foreclosed 
competitors and raised prices to public entities. With this evidence, it was reasonable for 
the Attorney General to believe an illegal restraint of trade was occurring. The trial court 
erred in refusing to find reasonable cause and in imposing unjustified additional 
conditions on the State. 
ARGUMENT 
THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT PROVIDED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WITH 
REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT BRIXEN & 
CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS MAY POSSESS INFORMATION 
RELEVANT TO AN ONGOING ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION OF 
A CONSPIRACY RESTRAINING TRADE IN BUILDING 
HARDWARE 
I. REASONABLE CAUSE TO ENFORCE AN INVESTIGATIVE 
DEMAND REQUIRES ONLY A REASONED BELIEF THAT THIS 
TRADE RESTRAINT IS ILLEGAL 
A. Reasonable Cause 
1. The CID Statute 
The Attorney General's duty to investigate antitrust violations derives from 
constitutional and statutory mandates: 
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It is the policy of the state of Utah that a free market system shall govern 
trade and commerce in this state to promote the dispersion of economic and 
political power and the general welfare of all the people. Each contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or commerce is prohibited... . 
UTAH CONST, art. XII, §20. 
The Utah Antitrust Act contains a declaration of legislative intent: 
The Legislature finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the 
free market system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive 
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest 
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic, political and social institutions. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-912 (1999). 
If the Attorney General is investigating anticompetitive conduct, civil investigative 
demands can be issued to compel the production of documents, testimony, or 
interrogatory responses: 
When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any person 
may be in possession, custody, or control of any information relevant to a 
civil investigation, [s]he may, prior to the commencement of a civil action 
thereon, issue and cause to be served upon that person a written civil 
investigative demand. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-917 (1) (1999). This statutory grant of CID authority enables 
the Attorney General to "gather[] enough information to make a proper determination as 
to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated." Evans 963 P.2d at 181. 
To enforce a CID she has issued, the Attorney General must demonstrate "that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this act, and that the 
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information sought or document demanded is relevant to the violation." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-917 (7)(b)(ii) (1999). There are two aspects to this "reasonable cause": a 
reasoned belief that a violation is occurring and some objective evidence supporting that 
belief. When these elements are met, the State can seek information from anyone 
possessing "relevant" information.2 
2. Evans v. State 
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the procedure a trial court should employ 
when analyzing whether reasonable cause supports the Attorney General's CID: 
[T]he decision is relatively uncomplicated, as it does not involve extensive 
weighing or testing of evidence or any resolution of conflicts on the 
evidence. The question at hearing is not whether the state's information is 
true or uncontradicted, but whether, assuming its accuracy, the state has in 
its possession sufficient information to satisfy a judge that it is reasonable 
to believe that there has been a violation of the act. 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998) (quoting Babbit v. Herndon, 581 P.2d 688, 
692 (Ariz. 1978) (emphasis in Evans)). The court went on to contrast this "civil" 
reasonable cause standard with criminal probable cause standards: 
Reason dictates that an investigation based on the reasonable cause standard 
requires less evidence than the "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact" required by the probable cause 
standard. Moreover, the reasonable cause standard would seem to allow an 
investigation to go forward on the assumption that the attorney general's 
case will only get stronger as the investigation proceeds. 
2
 UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(1) (1999). 
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Evans, 963 P.2d at 182. Evidence fails to meet the reasonable cause standard "only when 
it is '[w]holly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which 
supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Evans, 963 P.2d at 182 (quoting State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)). 
Although the Attorney General must be investigating conduct that appears 
unlawful, the CIDs can be issued at a preliminary stage of the investigation: 
We agree that the State must have some objective evidence that there has 
been a violation of the antitrust laws. However, as previously mentioned, 
the purpose of the investigative power is to aid the State in determining 
whether an enforcement action should even be initiated. The higher 
protections afforded by higher standards are not necessary because CIDs are 
part of an investigation rather than an enforcement action. 
Evans, 963 P.2d at 183. 
The two-part question a trial court should answer in evaluating reasonable cause is 
whether the State has a reasoned belief that an antitrust violation has occurred and can 
demonstrate "some" amount of "objective evidence" supporting its belief. 
B. The Illegal Conduct 
7. The "Activities Under Investigation" 
When issuing a CID, the State is required to identify the suspected violation. 
"Each demand shall state: (i) the nature of the activities under investigation, constituting 
the alleged antitrust violation, which may result in a violation of this act and the 
applicable provision of law " UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(2)(a) (1999) (emphasis 
added). 
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The principal purpose of this requirement is to enable the CID recipient to 
determine which documents, relevant to the investigation, should be produced. 'The test, 
however, must be whether the statement in the demand as to the nature of the conduct 
under investigation is sufficient to determine the relevancy of the documents demanded 
for inspection." Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F.Supp. 391, 397 (D. Minn. 
1963). 
Inclusion of a statement describing the "nature of activities under investigation" is 
not designed, however, to invite the CID recipient to second-guess the State's legal 
theory, argue whether such conduct can be justified in some circumstances, or discover 
how much evidence the State already has gathered implicating the targets. See Babbitt v. 
Herndon, 581 P.2d 688, 691 (Ariz. 1978) (CID recipient not entitled to counterdiscovery 
at such an early stage). 
Under Utah law, inclusion of the statement describing the activities under 
investigation serves a second purpose: allowing court review of the State's reasonable 
cause prevents investigative abuses. Evans, 963 P.2d at 182. In doing such a review, the 
trial court's role is to examine whether it is reasonable for the Attorney General to believe 
there has been a violation.3 
3
 This inquiry is conducted in light of "the assumption that the attorney general's 
case will only get stronger as the investigation proceeds." Evan, 963 P.2d at 182. 
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2. Description of This Violation 
The CID issued to Brixen cited UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-914 (1) and (2) (1999) 
as the law applicable to this investigation, then described the "activities under 
investigation" as "[a] combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in the creation of 
door hardware specifications for public buildings and in the sale of door hardware for 
installation in public buildings in Utah." (R. 5; addendum B). 
In the face of this description, the trial court's two-part question becomes quite 
specific: is it reasonable for the Attorney General to believe that there is a "conspiracy in 
restraint of trade in the creation of door hardware specifications" and does the Attorney 
General have "some objective evidence" to support its belief. 
3. The Illegality of this Restraint 
Conspiracies in restraint of trade are prohibited by the Utah Constitution4 and by 
the Utah Antitrust Act: 
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to 
monopolize, any part of trade or commerce. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-914 (1999).5 
While many trade restraints are judged under the "rule of reason," others are 
4
 UTAH CONST, art. XII, §20, discussed supra. 
5
 These provisions are virtually identical to the federal antitrust laws found in the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (1997). 
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deemed so inherently pernicious that they are adjudged "per se" illegal. State v. 
Thompson, 751 P. 2d 805, 811 (Utah App. 1988). The Utah Antitrust Act categorizes 
four types of conduct as per se illegal: "price fixing, bid rigging, agreeing among 
competitors to divide customers or territories, or [] engaging in a group boycott with 
specific intent of eliminating competition . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-920(l)(a) 
(1999). 
To the extent that architects and a manufacturer agree to rig bids, create a 
procedure to boycott competitors, or implement actions that have the effect of fixing 
higher prices, the conduct is per se illegal. 
Since the 1979 adoption of the current Utah Antitrust Act, there has been only one 
reported Utah decision, besides Evans, interpreting the Act. In State v. Thompson, 751 
P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988), rev 'd on other grounds, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), a security 
officer employed by Utah Power & Light was responsible for making recommendations 
to UP&L management for the selection of security guard companies. On his 
recommendation, the company selected an outside security guard company, without 
competitive bidding. The company selected had paid money secretly to the security 
officer for excluding competitors in the selection process. Id. at 807. Thompson was 
charged and convicted of violating the Utah Antitrust Act and other laws. 
This court affirmed Thompson's conviction holding that "[w]hen the bribery is 
coupled with other acts tending to restrain trade, a claim under the Sherman Act may be 
12 
established." Id. (quoting Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F.Supp. 
633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982)). The "other acts" found by the Court of Appeals in the 
Thompson case included the security officer's "refusal to accept proposals from other 
security guard companies." Thompson, 751 P.2d at 811. The court found that "the 
primary purpose of the bribes was to restrain trade by eliminating all competition for the 
UP&L security contract." Id. Further, since "the usual course of action when selecting a 
security guard company is open bidding[]," id. at 814, an intent to violate the law could 
be inferred. 
In the instant case, architects submitted biased specifications (foreclosing the use 
of competitors' products) to public entities in exchange for free bid-drafting services 
provided to the architects by this manufacturer. This foreclosure of competitors is similar 
to the conduct found illegal in Thompson and justifies as reasonable the Attorney 
General's belief that trade is being restrained in the creation of door hardware 
specifications. 
The second part of the trial court's inquiry then should be whether the Attorney 
General could demonstrate "some objective evidence," Evans, 963 P.2d at 183, to support 
its belief that the "activities under investigation . . . may result in a violation of this 
a c t . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(2)(a)(i) (1999) (emphasis added). 
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II. THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED "REASONABLE CAUSE" 
SUPPORTING A CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND EXISTS EVEN 
IF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LACKS EVIDENCE OF AN 
ANTITRUST VIOLATION BY BRIXEN ITSELF 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling 
The trial court's March 28, 2000 written order did not explain its reasons for 
dismissing the CID, saying only that "Plaintiffs Petition . . . is granted as prayed . . . ." 
(R. 73-74; addendum E). The transcript of the reasonable cause hearing indicates, 
however, that the court applied an improper test in ruling the State had not met its burden 
of demonstrating evidence in support of its belief. 
Judge Lewis remarked that the Attorney General's investigation lacked a necessary 
"nexus" between the suspected violation and Brixen (R. 84:24) and that there was a "big 
hole" in the investigation (R. 84:42; addendum E). See also R. 84:38, 42-43. These 
conclusions can be reconciled with the evidence shown to the trial court only by 
understanding that the trial court changed the legal standard of "reasonable cause" the 
State must meet by adding requirements not found in the statute or case law. 
B. Judge Lewis Required the State to Demonstrate Illegal Conduct by Brixen 
Judge Lewis's refusal to enforce the CID issued to Brixen appeared to stem from a 
mistaken belief that the Attorney General had a burden of demonstrating reasonable 
grounds to believe that Appellee was violating the law. During the hearing, Judge Lewis 
frequently pressed the Attorney General to prove that Appellee was violating the law. 
"I'd like to know . . . what they stated Brixen & Christopher had done " (R. 84: 13). 
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"I haven't heard one thing indicating whether there was any wrongdoing that would lead 
you to tell them and conclude that they're a target." (R. 84:14). "[T]he government. . . 
[has] the wrong . . . target." (R. 84:17) In inquiring whether the State could establish 
whether Appellee itself had used specification writers, Judge Lewis inquired: "Well, have 
they or have they not?" (R. 84:26). "Many architects do it [use outside specification 
writers]. So why have you singled out Brixen & Christopher?" (R. 84: 34). 
This is the wrong focus. The Attorney General is not limited to requesting 
information only from those suspected of violating the law.6 If there is reasonable cause 
to believe that someone is violating the law, the State can seek information from anyone 
so long as "the information sought or document or object demanded is relevant to the 
violation." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(7)(b)(ii) (1999). See also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-10-917(1) (1999) (allowing issuance of a CID to "any person . . . in possession . . . of 
any [relevant] information . . . . " ) . 
The trial court seems to have been confused, believing that the State should 
demonstrate misconduct by a CID recipient before the CID could be enforced. 
Undoubtedly, if there were evidence that a CID recipient had committed a violation, that 
evidence would be relevant to determining reasonable cause. However, the absence of 
6
 While in this case, Brixen & Christopher is suspected of allowing this 
manufacturer to help write its bid specifications, the State does not yet have proof of that 
fact. This is the type of information sought in the CID issued to Brixen. Judge Lewis 
expressed her belief that the State's evidence did not show a violation by Brixen. But, a 
showing of misconduct by a CID recipient is not a prerequisite to enforcing a CID. 
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violation-specific conduct by a CID recipient does not disqualify the Slate from seeking 
relevant information. In fact, much of the information obtained during antitrust 
investigations comes from persons who are not suspected of misconduct. 
The Attorney General emphasized to Judge Lewis that the test was not whether 
Appellee was violating the law, but whether any person was violating the law and, if so, 
whether Appellee had information relevant to the violations being investigated (R. 84:9, 
29-30). Nevertheless, in requiring the State to establish that Appellee had violated the 
law, instead of simply establishing that Appellee had information relevant to a violation 
by the door hardware manufacturer, Judge Lewis applied an improper test. 
C. The Trial Court Objected to the State's "Target" Notice 
The CID issued to Appellee contained disclosures and warnings required by UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-917(2) (1999). Additionally, the CID put Appellee on notice that in 
responding to the CID, Appellee should consider itself a target. This notice troubled the 
trial court and appeared to contribute to the court's determination to dismiss the CID. 
(See R. 84:9-12, 35, 37-38, 43). 
Assuming that the State is not limited to obtaining information only from those 
against whom it already can demonstrate a likelihood of violation, then some of those 
from whom the State seeks information will be innocent third parties (such as banks, 
competitors, customers, suppliers, etc.). Other CID recipients may be at risk of being 
named as defendants. In either case, the entities are obliged to produce the requested 
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information. Entities that may end up as defendants still are required to provide 
information because one of the important purposes of the CID information-gathering 
process is to determine who has engaged in the unlawful conduct: "Likewise, the CIDs 
issued by the Utah Attorney General assist that agency in gathering enough information to 
make a proper determination as to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated." 
Evans, 963 P.26 at m. 
A business that has engaged in acts being investigated as anticompetitive risks 
being named as a defendant in an enforcement action. Because the State was seeking 
information from a company (Brixen) suspected of submitting specifications written by 
this manufacturer's representatives, the CID advised Brixen that it should consider itself a 
target when responding to the CID (R. 5). To the extent that this "target" notice was used 
by the trial court in evaluating whether the evidence at hand constituted reasonable cause 
or added to the trial court's resolve to dismiss the CID, that influence was erroneous. 
III. WHEN EVALUATING "REASONABLE CAUSE," A TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD NOT REQUIRE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO 
DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES OR 
THE DETAILS OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE 
INVESTIGATOR, NOR SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT EVALUATE 
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INFORMATION RELIED ON BY 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
A. The Trial Court Improperly Demanded Disclosure of Confidential Information 
At the March 16, 2000 reasonable cause hearing, Judge Lewis insisted it was not 
enough for the investigator to describe his findings: he was expected to identify the 
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people to whom he had spoken and describe what each had said; the trial court wanted 
disclosure of confidential sources. Examples of the court's comments include: 
• "Well who? Do you have the name of a witness? Is there an affidavit?" 
(R. 84:7-8). 
• "I'd like to know who stated to you that Brixen & Christopher was involved 
and what they stated Brixen & Christopher had done that caused you to 
conclude that they had engaged in this conduct." (R. 84:13). 
• "They've just told you - - they being an unidentified group of people. You 
still haven't given me any names." (R. 84:13). 
• "What I'm interested in, sir, is specifics. Who told you what that led you to 
these concerns[?] . . . And I'm going to know - - want to know exactly 
what they said about the plaintiff in this action." (R. 84:14). 
• "And what information, if any, do you have that that occurred in this 
case[?]" . . . [An explanation followed that information had come from 
DFCM and school districts.] "No, that's not a person. You're saying the 
school talked to you[?] Who at the school?" (R. 84:31). 
"Who were they?" (R. 84:35). 
B. Investigative Information Should be Confidential 
Under the Utah Antitrust Act, investigations are confidential until a public 
enforcement action is initiated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-917(8) (1999). The policy 
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reasons for this are readily apparent. As the supreme court noted in Evans, the Attorney 
General's goal is to determine whether there has been a violation of the antitrust laws. 
Evans, 963 P.2d at 183. Consequently, until the extent of a violation has been determined 
and it has been decided that an enforcement action is warranted, the existence of the 
investigation, the identity of the persons being investigated, and the identity of the 
persons who have been interviewed should remain confidential.7 
Indeed, the State is statutorily precluded from disclosing the sources of certain 
information. To the extent that the State's information derived from CIDs issued earlier 
to two other architectural firms, the Attorney General is prohibited from disclosing the 
sources of that information. "Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced 
under this section shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless confidentiality 
is waived in writing by the person who has testified, or produced documents or objects." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917 (8)(a) (1999). Similarly, investigative information is 
exempt from Utah public records law, whether obtained through compulsory process or 
provided voluntarily. UTAH CODE ANN. §§63-2-201 (5)(a); 63-2-304 (4), (9), (16), and 
7
 Some disclosure will always occur. The very fact that a recipient of a CID files a 
petition in district court to quash the CID discloses the existence of an investigation and 
the identity of that recipient. Also, in demonstrating the reasonable cause basis for the 
investigation, the State is required to disclose "objective evidence" regarding the basis for 
its investigation. Evans, 963 P.2d at 183. However, that should not mean that the State is 
required to identify each person from whom it has obtained information. 
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(17) (1997).8 
The State explained to Judge Lewis its desire not to disclose confidential 
information: "Part of the concern is that we are reluctant - - or concerned about 
publicizing the components of an investigation that we are still hoping to maintain 
confidential." (R. 84:15-16; see 84:21).9 
This desire to keep the investigation confidential is grounded on three important 
principles. First, the recipient of a CID should not be entitled to use the petition process 
to discover how much information the State already knows and then use that knowledge 
to fashion, or limit, its response to the CID.10 Second, other persons being investigated 
8
 Federal law imposes the same restriction: 
Any material which is received by the [Federal Trade] Commission in any 
investigation, a purpose of which is to determine whether any person may 
have violated any provision of the laws administered by the Commission, 
and which is provided pursuant to any compulsory process under this Act, 
or which is provided voluntarily in place of such compulsory process shall 
be exempt from disclosure under [the Freedom of Information Act]. 
15 U.S.C.A. §57b-2(f) (1997) (emphasis added). See National Education Ass'n v. FTC, 
1983-2 Trade Cas. ^65,654 (D. Mass. 1983). 
9
 In Evans, the supreme court acknowledged the practice of having an Attorney 
General's investigator describe his findings (including the fact that a customer had 
complained) in an affidavit. The complaining merchant in that case was never identified 
in any court proceedings. See 963 P.2d at 178-79, 183. 
10
 A CID recipient is not entitled to discovery from the State in preparing his 
defense. "To permit counterdiscovery at such an early stage in the enforcement 
proceedings would serve only to unduly hamper and delay the Attorney General's duty to 
investigate possible fraudulent practices." Babbitt v. Herndon, 581 P.2d 688, 691 (Ariz. 
1978). 
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should not be able to take advantage of a CID challenge in order to discover that they are 
being investigated and the precise nature of the investigation. The fear here is that 
records may not be preserved or the investigation will be much more difficult if the 
violator knows the focus of the investigation. Third, the persons being investigated, and 
those being interviewed, are entitled to have the existence or contents of the investigation 
not be disclosed if it turns out that violations have not occurred or if further investigation 
reveals that other persons are responsible. 
C. The Sufficiency of the State's Evidence Should be Evaluated, Not its Accuracy 
A trial court should not second-guess the accuracy or the sources of the evidence 
presented by the Attorney General: "[T]he question at hearing is not whether the state's 
information is true or uncontradicted, but whether, assuming its accuracy, the state has in 
its possession sufficient information . . . . " Evans, 963 P.2d at 182 (emphasis in original). 
The goal here is to allow the State to conduct an investigation designed to determine 
whether the suspected activity has, in fact, taken place. Seeking information pursuant to a 
CID is an important means of enabling the State to determine a) if certain conduct has 
occurred, b) whether the conduct is illegal, and c) whether an enforcement action should 
be initiated.11 
11
 Other examples of the trial court questioning the accuracy of the State's 
information include criticizing the State for not bringing into court for the court's review 
a document which had formed the basis for one of the State's conclusions (R. 84:15); 
commenting "So after this Bolton who you acknowledge was a competitor - - right there 
we've got an issue of credibility I would think - - determines and says and apparently 
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Judge Lewis's insistence on disclosing details of the investigation, in open court, 
publicizes confidential aspects of an ongoing investigation in a manner that diminishes 
the value and effectiveness of the entire inquiry- and jeopardizes the success of any 
resulting enforcement action. In analyzing reasonable cause, the inquiry is not whether 
the court believes that illegal conduct is occurring but whether it is reasonable for the 
Attorney General to believe that the violations are occurring.12 
there's some document which we haven't seen that - - specs on I guess door knobs and 
door bars and things like that. . . ." (R. 84:17); and pressing the State: "Do you have 
anything to show me that supports what you've just stated?" The State's attorney offered 
to put the investigator on the stand to discuss the foundation for the described 
information. The court replied: "No. I meant in documents. This must be in some form 
of a document isn't it, sir?" (R. 84:21). 
12
 At the hearing, Judge Lewis appeared influenced also by her disagreement with 
the investigative procedure set out in the statute, seeming to prefer that the State use some 
other means of gathering information (R. 84:37-39, 41-44). The court opined that "the 
A.G.'s office [should], for example, . . . call counsel for Brixen & Christopher and 
discuss it with them. Ask to have their clients come in perhaps. But I see nothing here 
that leads to a civil investigative demand." (R. 84:16). "And even if it's the correct entity 
to talk to, the approach may be totally wrong." (R. 84:17). Towards the end of the 
hearing, the court said: "But it's my perception that there are better ways of obtaining 
information than the way that we're using this case." (R. 84:36). (See generally R. 
84:36-40). 
In the end, the court deferred to counsel for Appellee, suggesting that his expertise 
be used in crafting a means of sharing information with the State - in a manner other than 
that employed by the State. "But Mr. Whitney has been at this longer than we have and 
may have some suggestion about how to get the architects' attention so that they do 
respond without being hit over the head with a club." (R. 84:41). The judge suggested 
considering a court-issued subpoena, but the State's attorney explained that such a 
procedure was not provided for by law (R. 84:41-42). Judge Lewis concluded that 
legislative action was needed to address this problem (R. 84:43-44). 
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IV. SUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED TO 
THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
BELIEF THAT A VIOLATION IS OCCURRING 
When the Attorney General believes she has found a conspiracy in restraint of 
trade, she is required to show some objective evidence to support her belief. Evans, 963 
P.2d at 183; UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917 (7)(b)(ii) (1999). When this test is applied, 
without the improper additional factors imposed by Judge Lewis, the analysis should be 
straightforward. 
A. The Evidence Presented to the Trial Court 
In support of its belief of an ongoing conspiracy in the bidding and sale of door 
hardware, the State presented, or proffered, to the trial court substantial facts and 
evidence. This evidence, in the form of an affidavit of the State's investigator, a copy of 
DFCM's contract governing the conduct of architects, and information proffered at the 
hearing demonstrated the following: 
Examination of several bidding specifications showed a bias toward a particular 
manufacturer's products, and that the specifications limited the ability of distributors to 
bid or supply door hardware products from other manufacturers (R. 31, 35-3, 38-39; 84:7, 
12,17,19,25,30,32). 
Architects performing work on state buildings are contractually required to get 
permission from the public entity before using any consultants to assist in preparing 
specifications and are expressly prohibited from using "sales" or "agent" consultants (R. 
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58, 84:23-24).13 Despite this requirement, building owners generally did not know of, or 
request, the bias toward this manufacturer or the foreclosure of other bidders (R. 35, 38; 
84:7, 18, 25). The CID sought to determine whether Brixen used outside consultants 
without notifying the public entities and the extent to which Brixen's bid specifications 
were prepared by manufacturers's consultants (R. 4-9; 84:23-24). 
The specification bias sometimes also required the use of only certain high-margin, 
authorized distributors of this manufacturer (R. 39). Distributors of competing products 
were either unable to bid, or had significantly higher burdens in bidding, products from 
other manufacturers (R. 35-37; 84:14-15, 17). 
Many Utah architects use outside spec writers (R. 34; 84:20, 24-25, 33-34). There 
are no independent specification writers in Utah; if an architect does not want to write - or 
is not capable of writing - the specifications herself, the only available specification 
13
 The contractual prohibition reads: 
12.2 CONSULTANTS 
12.2.1 NOT USE "SALES" OR "AGENT" CONSULTANTS. 
The Architect agrees not to use "sales" or "agent" consultants. Said 
Consultants are not to benefit financially either directly or indirectly from 
the sale or use of any product on or in the Project. 
12.2.2 CONSULTANT QUALIFICATIONS. All Consultants 
must be licensed for the professional practice used on Ihe Project and be 
approved, in advance, by the Owner in the Project. 
(R. 58; 84:23-24). 
24 
writers are affiliated with a manufacturer or distributor (R. 34; 84:13, 19-20, 24, 30-31). 
The national manufacturer being investigated offers free specification-writing 
services to architects and employs two persons whose only tasks are to write door 
hardware specifications for architects - for free (R. 34; 84:19, 25-26, 32-33). Many 
architectural firms doing work on public buildings in Utah appear to use specification 
writers affiliated exclusively with this national manufacturer (R. 34-35, 38; 84:20, 25-26). 
When a distributor of this manufacturer writes specifications limited to that 
manufacturer's brands, and wins the bid, the distributor is paid a bonus by the 
manufacturer (R. 37). This manufacturer varies its wholesale price to distributors 
depending on whether specifications for particular projects are limited to that 
manufacturer's products (R. 36). When door hardware specifications are written to 
require use of this national manufacturer's products, the wholesale price to the 
distributors is as much as 40% higher than for a bid open to products of other 
manufacturers (R. 36-37; 84:19-21, 25-26). Public entities, whose buildings are subject 
to this limitation, pay higher prices for door hardware than would be the case in the 
absence of these restraints (R. 38-39; 84:20-21, 25-26, 30). 
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. performs architectural work on new-
building construction for the State of Utah (R. 40; 84:24-25). The State believed, but was 
not certain, that Brixen used free specification writing services from this manufacturer (R. 
84:26). 
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B. Evidence is to be Considered as a Whole 
"[Reasonable cause is determined by combining all of the evidence and then 
determining whether, taken as a whole, there is reasonable cause to believe that the Utah 
Antitrust Act has been violated." Evans, 963 P.2d at 184. The Evans court, analyzing an 
investigator's affidavit and the articles of incorporation for one of the entities, determined 
not only that this "evidence" was adequate, but that the trial court "clearly erred" in 
dismissing the CIDs issued in that investigation. Id. 
Together, the evidence presented to the trial court here shows agreements between 
architects and this manufacturer where the agreements reduce competition for supplying 
door hardware to public buildings. Public entities victimized by this scheme overpay by 
as much as 40% for door hardware. Architects violate contractual conditions imposed by 
DFCM and harm their public agency clients when participating in this scheme. 
Judge Lewis's failure to enforce the CID issued to Brixen & Christopher, in light 
of the totality of this "objective evidence," was error. Taken as a whole, this evidence 
demonstrates that the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that an antitrust 
violation is occurring. 
CONCLUSION 
The duty of the trial court is to determine whether the Attorney General has a 
reasonable basis to support her belief that the law is being violated. Judge Lewis's 
inclusion of additional factors was erroneous. When the proper standard is applied, the 
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Attorney General demonstrated reasonable cause to conduct this investigation and to 
enforce this CID. 
The trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed and an order entered 
enforcing the CID issued to Appellee. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because of the importance of the issue presented by this appeal, the State requests 
this Court to set the matter for oral argument and to issue a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on^^September, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
WAYNE KLEIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
UNITED STATES CODE 
ANNOTATED 
TITLE 15 
COMMERCE AND TRADE 
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination m the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. 
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combi-
nation or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or 
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
S 2 . Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court. 
Ch. 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 15 § 5 7 b - 2 
§ 5 7 B - 2 . Confidentiality 
(f) Exemption from disclosure 
Any material which is received by the Commission in any investiga-
tion, a purpose of which is to determine whether any person may 
have violated any provision of the laws administered by the Commis-
sion, and which is provided pursuant to any compulsory process 
under this subchapter or which is provided voluntarily in place of 
such compulsory process shall be exempt from disclosure under 
section 552 of Title 5. 
Art. XII, § 1 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE XII 
CORPORATIONS 
Sec, 20. [Trusts and combinations prohibited.] 
Any combination by individuals, corporations, or associations, having for its 
object or effect the controlling of the price of any products of the soil, or of any 
article of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of exchange or transportation, 
is prohibited, and hereby declared unlawful, and against public policy. The 
Legislature shall pass laws for the enforcement of this section by adequate 
penalties, and in case of incorporated companies, if necessary for that purpose, 
it may declare a forfeiture of their franchise. 
History: Const. 1896. 
ACCESS TO RECORDS 
63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of 
records. 
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record that is private, 
controlled, or protected to any person except as provided in Subsection 
(5)(b), Section 63-2-202, or Section 63-2-206. 
(b) A governmental entity may disclose records that are private under 
Subsection 63-2-302(2) or protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons 
other than those specified in Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206 if the head of a 
governmental entity, or a designee, determines that there is no interest in 
restricting access to the record, or that the interests favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
63-2-304. Protected records. 
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental 
entity: 
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury to, or 
confer a competitive advantage upon a potential or actual competitor of, a 
commercial project entity as defined in Subsection 11-13-3(3); 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative 
enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for discipline, licensing, 
certification, or registration purposes, if release of the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations 
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or 
registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplin-
ary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair 
trial or impartial hearing; 
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source 
who is not generally known outside of government and, in the case of 
a record compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose informa-
tion furnished by a source not generally known outside of government 
if disclosure would compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit 
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known out-
side of government if disclosure would interfere with enforcement or 
audit efforts; 
(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity solely in 
anticipation of litigation that are not available under the rules of discov-
^(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, including the mental 
impressions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative ol a 
governmental entity concerning litigation; 
76-10-912. Legislative findings — Purpose of act. 
The Legislature finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the 
free market system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces 
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, 
political and social institutions. 
The purpose of this act is, therefore, to encourage free and open competition 
in the interest of the general welfare and economy of this state by prohibiting 
monopolistic and unfair trade practices, combinations and conspiracies in 
restraint of trade or commerce and by providing adequate penalties for the 
enforcement of its provisions. 
76-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities. 
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to 
monopolize, any part of trade or commerce. 
76-10-917. Civil antitrust investigations — Demand for 
production of documents and responses to writ-
ten interrogatories — Oral examination — Judi-
cial order for compliance — Confidentiality — 
Subpoenas precluded. 
(1) When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any 
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any information relevant to 
a civil antitrust investigation, he may, prior to the commencement of a civil 
action thereon, issue and cause to be served upon that person a written civil 
investigative demand requesting that person to: 
(a) produce the documentary material for inspection, copying, or repro-
duction by the state where the documents are located or produced; 
(b) give oral testimony under oath, concerning the subject of the 
investigation; 
(c) respond to written interrogatories; or 
(d) furnish any combination of these. 
(2) (a) Each demand shall state: 
(i) The nature of the activities under investigation, constituting the 
alleged antitrust violation, which may result in a violation of this act 
and the applicable provision of law; 
(ii) that the recipient is entitled to counsel; 
(iii) that the documents, materials, or testimony in response to the 
demand may be used in a civil or criminal proceeding; 
(iv) that if the recipient does not comply with the demand the Office 
of the Attorney General may compel compliance by appearance, upon 
reasonable notice to the recipient, before the district court in the 
judicial district wherein the recipient resides or does business and 
only upon a showing before that district court that the requirements 
of Subsection (7) have been met; 
(v) that the recipient has the right at any time before the return 
date of the demand, or within 30 days, whichever period is shorter, to 
seek a court order determining the validity of the demand; and 
(vi) that at any time during the proceeding the person may assert 
any applicable privilege. 
76-10-917 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
(b) If the demand is for production of documentary material, it shall 
also: 
(i) describe the documentary material to be produced with suffi-
cient definiteness and certainty as to permit the material to be fairly 
identified; 
(ii) prescribe return dates that provide a reasonable period of time 
within which the material demanded may be assembled and made 
available for inspection and reproduction; and 
(iii) identify the individual at the attorney general's office to whom 
the materia] shall be made available. 
(c) If the demand is for the giving of oral testimony, it shall also: 
(i) prescribe the date, time, and place at which oral testimony shall 
be commenced; 
(ii) state that a member of the attorney general's office staff shall 
conduct the examination; and 
(iii) state that the recording or the transcript of such examination 
shall be submitted to and maintained by the Office of the Attorney 
General. 
(d) If the demand is for responses to written interrogatories, it shall 
also: 
(i) state that each interrogatory shall be answered separately and 
fully in writing and under oath, unless the person objects to the 
interrogatory, in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated 
in lieu of an answer; 
(ii) state that the answers are to be signed by the person making 
them, and the objections are to be signed by the attorney making 
them; 
(iii) identify by name and address the individual at the Office of the 
Attorney General on whom answers and objections provided under 
this Subsection (2)(d) are to be served; and 
(iv) prescribe the date on or before which these answers and 
objections are to be served on the identified individual. 
(3) The civil investigative demand may be served upon any person who is 
subject to the jurisdiction of any Utah court and shall be served upon the 
person in the manner provided for service of a subpoena. 
(4) (a) The documents submitted in response to a demand served under this 
section shall be accompanied by an affidavit, in the form the demand 
designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is 
directed or, if not a natural person, by a person having knowledge of the 
facts and circumstances relating to the production. 
(b) The affidavit shall state that all of the documentary material 
required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the 
person to whom the demand is directed has in good faith been produced 
and made available to the Office of the Attorney General. 
(c) The affidavit shall identify any demanded documents that are not 
produced and state the reason why each document was not produced. 
(5) (a) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral 
testimony served under this section shall be taken before an officer 
authorized to administer oaths or affirmations by the laws of the United 
States or of the place where the examination is held. The officer before 
whom the testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 76-10-917 
affirmation and shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction 
and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness. If the testimony 
is taken stenographically, it shall be transcribed and the officer before 
whom the testimony is taken shall promptly transmit the transcript of the 
testimony to the Office of the Attorney General. 
(b) When taking oral testimony, all persons other than personnel from 
the attorney general's office, the witness, counsel for the witness, and the 
officer before whom the testimony is to be taken shall be excluded from the 
place where the examination is held. 
(c) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand served 
under this section shall be taken in the county where the person resides or 
transacts business or in any other place agreed upon by the attorney 
general and the person. 
(d) When testimony is fully transcribed, the transcript shall be certified 
by the officer before whom the testimony was taken and submitted to the 
witness for examination and signing, in accordance with Rule 30(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the deposition shall be furnished 
free of charge to each witness upon his request. 
(e) Any change in testimony recorded by nonstenographic means shall 
be made in the manner provided in Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for changing deposition testimony recorded by nonstenographic 
means. 
(f) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony 
under this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by 
counsel. Counsel may advise the person, in confidence, either upon the 
request of the person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to any 
question asked of the person. The person or counsel may object on the 
record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for the 
record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be made, 
received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that the person 
is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any constitu-
tional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege against 
self-incrimination. If the person refuses to answer any question, the 
attorney general may petition the district court for an order compelling the 
person to answer the question. 
(g) If any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testi-
mony or other information pursuant to this section refuses to answer any 
questions or produce information on grounds of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the testimony of that person may be compelled as in 
criminal cases. 
(h) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand 
served under this section is entitled to the same fees and mileage which 
are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the state of Utah. Witness 
fees and expenses shall be tendered and paid as in any civil action. 
(6) The providing of any testimony, documents, or objects in response to a 
civil investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall be 
considered part of an official proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-501. 
(7) (a) If a person fails to comply with the demand served upon him under 
this section, the attorney general may file in the district court of the county 
in which the person resides, is found, or does business, a petition for an 
order compelling compliance with the demand. Notice of hearing of the 
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petition and a copy of the petition shall be served upon the person, who 
may appear in opposition to the petition. If the court finds that the demand 
is proper, that there is reasonable cause to believe there has been a 
violation of this act, and that the information sought or document or object 
demanded is relevant to the violation, it shall order the person to comply 
with the demand, subject to modifications the court may prescribe. 
(b) (i) At any time before the return date specified in a demand or 
within 30 days after the demand has been served, whichever period is 
shorter, the person who has been served may file a petition for an 
order modifying or setting aside the demand. This petition shall be 
filed in the district court in the county of the person's residence, 
principal office, or place of business, or in the district court in Salt 
Lake County. The petition shall specify each ground upon which the 
petitioner relies in seeking the relief sought. The petition may be 
based upon any failure of the demand to comply with the provisions of 
this section or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege 
of the petitioner. The petitioner shall serve notice of hearing of the 
petition and a copy of the petition upon the attorney general. The 
attorney general may submit an answer to the petition within 30 days 
after receipt of the petition. 
(ii) After hearing on the petition described in Subsection (7)(b)(i), 
and for good cause shown, the court may make any further order in 
the proceedings that justice requires to protect the person from 
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden, or 
expense. At any hearing pursuant to this section it is the attorney 
general's burden to establish that the demand is proper, that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this act, 
and that the information sought or document or object demanded is 
relevant to the violation. 
(8) (a) Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced under this 
section shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless confiden-
tiality is waived in writing by the person who has testified, or produced 
documents or objects. 
flt>) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the attorney 
general may disclose testimony or documents obtained under this section, 
without either the consent of the person from whom it was received or the 
person being investigated, to: 
(i) any grand jury; and 
(ii) officers and employees of federal or state law enforcement 
agencies, provided the person from whom the information, docu-
ments, or objects were obtained is notified 20 days prior to disclosure, 
and the federal or state law enforcement agency certifies that the 
information will be: 
(A) maintained in confidence, as required by Subsection (8)(a); 
and 
(B) used only for official law enforcement purposes. 
(9) Use of a civil investigative demand under this action precludes the 
invocation by the attorney general of Section 77-22-2. 
76-10-920. Fine and imprisonment for violation — Cer-
tain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo con-
tendere. 
(1) (a) Any person who violates Section 76-10-914 by price fixing, bid 
rigging, agreeing among competitors to divide customers or territories, or 
by engaging in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating compe-
tition shall be punished, notwithstanding Sections 76-3-301 and 76-3-302: 
(i) if an individual, by a fine not to exceed $100,000 or by impris-
onment for an indeterminate time not to exceed three years, or both; 
or 
(ii) if by a person other than an individual, a fine not to exceed 
$500,000. 
(b) Subsection (a) may not be construed to include vertical agreements 
between a manufacturer, its distributors, or their subdistributors dividing 
customers and territories solely involving the manufacturer's commodity 
or service where the manufacturer distributes its commodity or service 
both directly and through distributors or subdistributors in competition 
with itself. 
(2) A defendant may plead nolo contendere to a charge brought under this 
title but only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by the 
court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest 
of the public in the effective administration of justice. 
ADDENDUM B 
R. WAYNE KLEIN #3819 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South.. 5* Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-0310 
TO: Brixen & Christopher 
Architects PC 
252 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND 
INTERROGATORIES 
No. 2000-7-265 
I. CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND 
The Attorney Genera] is conducting a civil investigation into possible violations of the 
Utah antitrust laws. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-916 and 76-10-917, 
the Attorney General has found reasonable cause to conduct the investigation and is issuing this 
Civil Investigative Demand. 
Brixen & Christopher Architects PC is required to respond to the interrogatories listed in 
Exhibit A. Responses to the Interrogatories shall be provided on or before January 31, 2000, to 
Wayne Klein. Assistant Attorney General, at 160 East 300 South. Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0872. 
II. NOTICES 
As provided by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-917(2), you are notified that: 
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R E C E I V E D 
JAN 04 2000 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER 
ARCHITECTS 
1. The activities under investigation, constituting alleged violations of §§76-10-914(1) and 
(2), are: 
A combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in the creation of door hardware 
specifications for public buildings and in the sale of door hardware for installation in 
public buildings in Utah. 
2. You are entitled to counsel during all phases of this investigation. 
3. Any documents or materials produced in response to this Civil Investigative Demand 
may be used in a civil or criminal proceeding against you or anyone else. 
4. If you do not comply with this Civil Investigative Demand, the Utah Attorney General 
may seek appropriate remedies in the District Court compelling compliance with this 
Demand upon a showing that the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-917(7) have 
been met. 
5. You have the right at any time before the return date of the Demand, or within 30 days, 
whichever period is shorten to seek a court order determining the validity of the Demand. 
6. At any time during the proceeding, you are entitled to assert all privileges, including the 
privilege against self-incrimination, if available. 
7. You are a target of this investigation. 
8. Each Interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing, and under oath -
unless an objection is made. Any objection, and the reasons therefor, must be stated in 
lieu of an answer. The answers are to be signed by an officer of the company who is 
answering the Interrogatories. Objections are to be signed by the attorney making them. 
9. If you have any questions regarding this CID, you may contact Del Mortensen, 
investigator at the Utah Attorney General's Office at (801) 366-0310. 
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m- ISSUANCE 
DATED this 7 ~~cfay of January', 2000 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General of Utah 
R. WAYNE KLEIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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EXHIBIT A 
This exhibit consists of Interrogatories to which responses are to be provided in 
accordance with the Civil Investigative Demand. 
INTERROGATORS 
1, Has your firm, in the past 5 years, prepared specifications for construction (new or 
remodel) of one or more public buildings in Utah? If not, execute the certification 
below and return the CID to the address indicated above. 
2. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 1 is yes, identify the project and provide the bid 
dates for each publicly-fiinded building project that included door hardware 
(hinges, locks, closers, exit devices, etc.) for which your firm prepared 
specifications in the past five years. Attach a copy of the door hardware portion 
of each such set of specifications. If none of the specifications prepared by your 
firm on public buildings have included any components of door hardware, execute 
the certification below and return the CID to the address indicated above. 
3. For each publicly-funded building project, that included door hardware 
components, identified in Interrogatory No. 2, identify any outside person/entity 
used by your firm to prepare, or assist in preparing, each set of door hardware 
specifications, describe the role played by that person/entity in preparing the 
specifications, and describe that person's/entity's relationship to the firm (e.g. 
independent contractor, paid consultant, manufacturer's representative, product 
distributor, etc.). 
4. Describe any compensation your firm paid, or any other agreement your firm had, 
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with each person/entity identified in Interrogator}7 No. 3, for each public project. 
For each publicly-funded project, that included door hardware components, 
identified under Intenogatory No. 2, describe any directions or requirements your 
fiim received from the building owner and/or general contractor of that project 
pertaining to door hardware preferences, performance criteria, or the necessary 
minimum qualifications of door hardware suppliers. Describe the documentation 
you have of any such directions or requirements. 
For each publicly-funded project for which your firm received outside assistance 
in preparing door hardware specifications, describe the extent to which the firm 
made any changes to the specifications prepared by the outside person/entity. 
Describe the documentation you have of any such changes. 
Describe any contact or discussions between your firm and any person or entity 
not affiliated with your firm (excluding any attorneys representing your firm) 
relating to the subject of this Civil Investigative Demand up to the date of the 
firm's response to this demand. 
End of Interrogatories. 
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CERTIFICATION 
Certification That Firm has Done No Work on Public Buildings in Past Five Years 
On behalf of the architectural firm receiving this civil investigative demand, the 
undersigned certifies that the firm : 
Ctyeck One Box 
D has prepared no specifications for construction (new or remodel) of one or more 
public buildings in Utah during the past five years, as described in Interrogatory 
No. 1, or 
D has prepared specifications for public buildings in Utah within the past five years 
but none of those specifications have included any components of door hardware 
as identified in Interrogatory No. 2, 
Signature: 
Printed Name: 
Title: 
Date: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this day of January, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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ADDENDUM C 
R. WAYNE KLEIN #3819 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801) 366-0358 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0315 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER 
ARCHITECTS, P.C. a Utah 
Professional Corporation ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) L. DEL MORTENSEN 
1 Case No. 00-0900651 
1 Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
L. DEL MORTENSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes on his oath and states: 
1 
Affiant 
1. I am a Special Agent and antitrust investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office. I 
have investigated business or white collar crime for over 24 years. I have been assigned 
specifically to investigate antitrust violations for the past 1 lA years. During those 1 lA 
years, I have participated in the investigation of several antitrust violations. I have 
received specialized training in the investigation of antitrust violations. I am a certified 
peace officer for the State of Utah and currently hold the rank of Lieutenant. 
2. 1 am the investigator assigned to the investigation at issue in this matter and have 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the civil investigative 
demands in this matter. 
Background of this Investigation 
3. This investigation began in September 1998 and initially revolved around limits placed 
on door hardware that could be bid on a building project for a school district in Southern 
Utah. Since that time, the investigation has expanded to include bids for publicly-funded 
construction projects around the state. 
4. During this investigation, I have interviewed over twenty individuals familiar with the 
sale of door hardware via bidding for installation in public buildings. The individuals 
interviewed include representatives of a major manufacturer of door hardware, 
distributors of door hardware, school district officials, architects, and the Utah Division 
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of Facilities and Construction Management (DFCM). In addition, I have reviewed 
documents received from a Utah college, school districts, and DFCM as well as 
documents received from two Salt Lake architectural firms pursuant to Civil Investigative 
Demands issued to the architectural firms. 
5. I believe that petitioner's architectural firm might be a party to agreements or 
combinations which have the effect of suppressing price competition in the market for the 
public bidding of door hardware to be installed in public building projects in Utah. This 
belief is based on my experience in investigating antitrust violations and the following 
additional information. 
Role of Architects in Bids for Construction of Public Buildings 
6. School districts and other owners of public buildings generally select an architectural firm 
to design the building to be built. Among other tasks, the architect is responsible for 
identifying the door hardware needed for the building, such as door closers, exit devices 
(crash bars), and locking devices. The architect is paid to draft specifications to be 
included in the construction bid for the public building. The goal of having specifications 
drafted and the bidding process is to obtain as much competition as possible for products 
meeting the specification. The competition is designed to ensure fairness and low prices 
for the public agency. 
7. The owner of the public building relies on the architect to a) have the expertise to draft 
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door hardware specifications that will meet the needs of the building owner, b) be 
completely objective in the drafting of specifications so no particular manufacturer or 
distributor will be favored without a justified reason for the preference, c) not have 
improper or undisclosed alliances with interested manufacturers or distributors, and d) 
draft specifications that will result in as much competition as possible for the purchase of 
door hardware. 
8. It is my understanding that the fees paid to architects for their work on public building 
projects in Utah are a percentage of the total cost to construct or remodel the building. 
Consequently, the higher the cost of the building, the higher the fee to the architect. 
Conversely, if an architect, through its effort, reduces the cost of some components of the 
building, the architect's fees will be lower. 
9. In some cases, a building owner may request a certain brand of door hardware because 
that brand is already in use in other buildings owned by the entity. However, in many 
cases, the public agency does not request that the architect limit the door hardware 
specifications to certain brands. In these cases, the building owner relies on the expertise 
of the architect to draft specifications that will deliver products that meet the needs of the 
agency, at the lowest possible prices. 
Spec-Writing Consultants 
10. When the architect is engaged by the public agency to create construction plans and door 
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hardware specifications, the architect's fee includes compensation for time to be spent by 
the architect to draft door hardware specifications. 
11. Commercial sources, such as "Master Spec" computerized specifications, are available to 
architects as they draft specifications for door hardware. In some cases, however, the 
building owner may have needs that are not easily adapted from the commercial sources, 
or the architect may not feel that she has the expertise (or does not want to spend the 
time) to personalize the specifications for the public agency. 
12. In Utah, some architects write their own door hardware specifications. However, a large 
portion, and perhaps a majority, of architects for public buildings in Utah engage the 
services of outside consultants for assistance in drafting these specifications. The 
complexity of door hardware specifications encourages architects to use outside 
consultants. 
13. There are no independent door hardware specification writers in Utah. All specification 
writers are paid either by manufacturers or by distributors of door hardware. For 
example, one of the largest manufacturers of door hardware in the country has engaged 
two persons in Utah whose sole task is to assist architects in writing door hardware 
specifications. Thus, when an outside specification writer is used, that specification 
writer is always affiliated with either a manufacturer or a distributor seeking to sell 
certain brands of door hardware. 
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14. As a result, if the affiliated "spec writer" has drafted door hardware specifications that 
favor the brand sold by that manufacturer or distributor, it is unlikely that the architect 
will change the specifications and is even more unlikely that the building owner will 
detect the biased specifications. This result is made more likely by the general practice of 
architects not disclosing to building owners when the architect has engaged the services 
of outside spec writers. 
15. My investigation has uncovered many public building bids where the door hardware 
specifications are written without the option for substitution ("no sub"), so that only 
certain products will qualify for the bid. In some of those cases, the building owner has 
requested that the limitation be included. However, this does not explain all of the spec 
limitations. The investigation conducted to date indicates that a substantial number of 
public building projects have included door hardware specifications which a) limited the 
brands which would qualify under the bid, b) were not requested by the building owner, 
and c) resulted in the public agency paying higher prices than would have been the case 
otherwise. 
16. While these brand-specific specifications may include the phrase "or equal," other brands 
are at a distinct disadvantage in getting their products approved for the bid. Even if 
another brand is of equivalent or superior quality, the manufacturer or distributor of that 
brand must take the time and effort to prove, to the satisfaction of the architect, that the 
6 
product is of equivalent quality. This requires effort and expense not required of the 
brand which already is specified in the specifications. Finally, in some cases, the space of 
time between the issuance of a bid and the time when bid responses are due does not 
allow an "or equal" brand to get its product qualified and prepare a bid. Thus, the "or 
equal" designation puts any competing brands at a significant disadvantage in competing 
for a bid whose specifications already identify only one brand. 
Manufacturer and Distributor Involvement in Specification Writing 
17. A large manufacturer of popular door hardware appears to have created a sophisticated 
system for increasing the prices being paid by public agencies and for making it 
extremely difficult for other brands to be included in bids for public buildings. This 
manufacturer provides door hardware to its three Utah distributors according to a variable 
wholesale price which is set at the discretion of the manufacturer. If the door hardware is 
to be installed in a project for which bids have been requested, the three distributors can 
all buy the products from the manufacturer at that same wholesale price. If those bid 
specifications are limited so that only the products of that manufacturer qualify, the 
distributors receive no discount, and may purchase the door hardware at that wholesale 
price. If, however, the bid specifications are written in a way that more than one brand 
can qualify to provide door hardware, either by the use of performance specifications or 
because more than one brand is listed, the manufacturer will grant to its distributors 
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significant discounts from that wholesale price. This discount permits the distributors to 
offer the door hardware to contractors bidding on Utah public buildings at a price 
significantly below the normal wholesale price. The discount by the manufacturer to the 
distributors may be 30-40% below the regular wholesale price. The manufacturer's 
wholesale discounts result in a lower price for the public agency. 
18. Competing brands are significantly hampered in their ability to compete for door 
hardware bids. Indeed, if the door hardware specifications are limited to one brand (no-
sub), competitors cannot even qualify to bid. 
19. In addition to the manufacturer, Utah distributors of that brand also may offer spec 
writing services to architects. Those spec writing services also are offered to architects 
for free. The distributor covers the cost of writing door hardware specifications not only 
from the increased chances that his product will be chosen for the bid, but also by 
compensation from the manufacturer. This manufacturer has a policy of paying a bonus 
to a distributor that a) writes a specification that permits only that brand to qualify and b) 
actually wins the bid to supply that product. This bonus can be used to offset the costs of 
offering spec writing services and to reward the distributor for getting that product 
placed. The manufacturer can afford to pay bonuses in cases such as this because its 
wholesale price is higher than it would be if other brands were permitted to be bid. 
20. The bonus payments the distributor receives from the manufacturer are an incentive for 
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the distributor's spec writers to write specifications favorable to this manufacturer's 
products. 
21. From my review of door hardware specifications for public projects, it appears that a 
clear majority of no-substitution specifications identify products of this manufacturer. 
No-substitution specifications for other brands are less common, and to my knowledge 
occur only when the building owner requests the limitation. 
22. A bid containing door hardware specifications limited to only one brand still will result in 
a certain level of limited competition. If the manufacturer succeeds in getting an architect 
to include specifications limited to its brand, there still are three distributors in Utah of 
that brand. Those distributors are competing to be selected to provide the door hardware 
to contractors building the new edifice. However, that competition only limits the 
amount of the markup being charged by the distributors. It does not provide competition 
on the wholesale price. Each of those distributors is paying the same "regular" wholesale 
price for the product. On the other hand, if other brands are included in the 
specifications, the public agency will get competition for the wholesale price as well as 
the competition among distributors. A brand-limited specification provides competition 
only for one level of the cost of door hardware and excludes competition on other levels. 
23. Because this dominant manufacturer's efforts to capture the door hardware market are 
focused on architectural firms and, to a lesser extent, on building maintenance 
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representatives, rather than on distributors, the distributors have less ability to deliver low 
bid prices. By using strategies which result in architects preparing increasingly restrictive 
bid specifications favoring its products, the manufacturer is ensuring its products will be 
sold, without discounts, regardless of which distributor wins the bid. 
24. In addition to brand-limited specifications, spec writers from this manufacturer and its 
distributors also frequently include requirements that the supplier of door hardware be a 
"factory direct" supplier. While this provision is written ostensibly to exclude "fly-by-
night" contractors and suppliers, it actually serves to protect the high margins of the 
authorized distributors of this manufacturer. This requirement prevents other reputable 
contractors from obtaining the door hardware from other sources at prices below those of 
the authorized distributors. 
Restriction of Trade 
25. It appears that the agreements by which architectural firms permit manufacturers' 
representatives to write specifications for door hardware to be included in bids for public 
buildings in Utah are restraining trade by preventing other brands from being qualified to 
be included in bids by contractors and by preventing other suppliers from competing 
against the manufacturer's authorized distributors. These restrictions result in public 
agencies paying higher prices for door hardware components of public buildings than 
would be the case in the absence of these restraints. 
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Relevant Information Possessed by Petitioner 
26. Based on a visit to DFCM, I am aware that Petitioner, Brixen & Christopher, does 
perform architectural services on public buildings. 
27. In June 1999,1 sent a questionnaire to a number of architectural firms in the Salt Lake 
area, including Petitioner, seeking information to assist us in this investigation. Petitioner 
failed to respond to the questionnaire or provide any information voluntarily. 
Further, Affiant saith not. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CECILIA D. MILLER 
160 East 300 South, 5th Fir. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 
My Commission Expires 
January 9, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
n 
-X 
L. DEL MORTENSE 
H ^ C W C J L ^ / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd day of February, 2000. 
UL. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
'•hiim 
ll 
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Third JuH«rW nistridt 
ORIGINAL APR 1 0 2000 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*** 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS ,j )
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF,!) 
) 
) 
Defendant.) 
Case Number: 000900651 
*** 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Thursday, March 16, 2000 
2:18 P.M. 
Transcript of Video Tape Recording of Hearing 
Transcribed by: 
PAMELA C. SMITH, CSR, RMR 
3454 Creek Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
File No. 31600ps 
1 Appearance of Counsel: 
2 For the Plaintiff: 
3 
4 
For the Defendant: 
5 
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MOYLE & DRAPER 
BY: Hardin A. Whitney 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. WAYNE KLEIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
I 
1 THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 2000, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
2 PROCEEDINGS. 
3 THE COURT: We have two matters that need to be 
4 handled this afternoon. One of them is Brixen vs. State of 
5 Utah, 000900651. Mr. Whitney is on — here on behalf of the 
6 Plaintiff. And counsel could I get you to state your 
7 appearance? 
8 MR. KLEIN: Yes. Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney 
9 General on behalf of the State. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. And we 
11 have a motion to set aside that we've got on for hearing and 
12 I have generally reviewed the pleadings. I'm happy to hear 
13 oral argument with reference to the specifics. And counsel 
14 you may proceed. 
15 MR. WHITNEY: Thank you, Your Honor. May it 
16 please the court and counsel. As you noticed my name is 
17 Hardin Whitney and I'm here representing Brixen & Christopher 
18 Architects who is the petitioner in the case. 
19 This case arose when the attorney general issued a 
20 investigative — civil investigative demand in which they 
21 claimed that they were investigating a combination or a 
22 conspiracy in restraintive trade for the sale of door 
23 hardware. 
24 The disquieting thing about the demand is that it 
25 contained two items. The first was that if any materials 
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1 I produced pursuant to the demand could be used in any future 
2 civil or criminal matters involving Brixen & Christopher and 
3 the second thing they said was that Brixen & Christopher was 
4 a target of the investigation. 
5 THE COURT: And when were these representations 
6 made Mr. Whitney, approximately. 
7 MR. WHITNEY: Well, they were made with the 
8 demand which our client received on about the sixth or 
9 seventh of January of this year. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. KLEIN: If I may — there are written 
12 disclosures contained in the CID. 
13 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
14 MR. KLEIN: There are written statements, 
15 disclosures contained in the civil investigative demand. So 
16 it's stated right in the demand. 
17 MR. WHITNEY: What they said in — the civil 
18 investigative demand when it was issued contained these 
19 statements that — what I call the civil Miranda warning kind 
2 0 of thing that — 
21 THE COURT: And it was in January as you 
22 indicated? 
23 MR. WHITNEY: That's right. Nowf under the 
24 statute under which the civil — the CID I'm going to refer 
25 to it as, was issued, the target of the investigation is 
entitled to require the State to show that it has reasonable 
cause, and that's in quotes, to believe that a violation of 
the act has occurred and that the information sought is 
relevant to the claimed violation. 
We — that's why we're here. We elected to file 
that procedure and asked that the court — that the State 
show reasonable cause. The statute uses the language that I 
just recited but — and it doesn't say that they have to find 
that Brixen & Christopher was in violation but we believe 
that that's implicit. It has to have some — they have to 
show some relevant information relating to the claimed 
activities of Brixen & Christopher. 
THE COURT: On the target status, right? 
MR. WHITNEY: Right. Right. 
THE COURT: Have you had any formal discussions, 
Mr. Whitney, with the A.G.'s office about this issue? 
MR. WHITNEY: Well, I started out by asking them 
if they would furnish us with the affidavit that they've now 
furnished us before I filed this. 
THE COURT: When did you get the affidavit? 
MR. WHITNEY: Well, he said as long as I would 
respond to the civil investigation demand then he would give 
us the affidavit but that was putting the cart before the 
horse as far as I was concerned. 
THE COURT: So when did you actually get it? 
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MR. WHITNEY: So we actually — I actually 
proceeded and we filed — I can't remember the exact date we 
filed this but it was shortly after that. I've got the date 
here. 
THE COURT: It's been some time in coming to 
you. Would that be fair to say? 
MR. WHITNEY: Yes. I'm sorry. Say again? 
THE COURT: I say it's been some time in getting 
to you? 
MR. WHITNEY: The civil investigative demand? 
No, they sent that over to me right away, my client did. And 
we filed our petition on January 25th. So, we were — it was 
only about three weeks after the initial investigative demand 
was filed. And our — our rationale was that if the affidavit 
that they then filed we felt for some reasonable — give some 
reasonable cause for the demand that we would comply. But as 
you see from the memorandum that we filed and from our being 
here today we don't think that it does show reasonable cause 
and we think that it should be dismissed. 
THE COURT: What I'd like to do is certainly 
afford you the opportunity to say anything additional that 
you wish to at this time but it occurs to me we might be 
better in terms of use of our time by letting opposing 
counsel respond to that very query, what have they got, and 
then let you respond to what they have to say. 
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1 Mr. Whitney, does that seem appropriate? 
2 MR. WHITNEY: That's fine, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right. And that way I won't 
4 burden anyone's right to speak that we maybe use more 
5 effectively the time. So let's cut to the chase. What have 
6 you got? 
7 MR. KLEIN: Our investigation has started with a 
8 school district who was building a school building in Iron 
9 County. And in that process we found that a large door 
10 hardware manufacturer — this company makes locks, exit 
11 devices, crash bars and the closures, the ones that 
12 automatically close the door when you go through it. 
13 THE COURT: Some school building somewhere in 
14 Utah had some defect, is that correct? 
15 MR. KLEIN: No, no. What happened is the 
16 manufacturer of this equipment went to the architect and 
17 convinced the architect to write the specs for the new 
18 building that would allow only that company's products to 
19 qualify. And the building owner, Iron County School 
20 District, did not know about it. Did not request that it be 
21 limited. 
22 THE COURT: Where did you get this data? 
23 MR. KLEIN: We got this from the Iron County 
24 School District. 
25 THE COURT: Well who? Do you have the name of a 
1 witness? Is there an affidavit? 
2 MR. KLEIN: I have an affidavit from our 
3 investigator in the file. 
4 THE COURT: I guess where we are taking fairly 
5 dramatic steps here, and I can only imagine what one would 
6 feel like if one were served with this sort of investigative 
7 demand. But it's got to be an awesome and frightening 
8 experience. So I'm going to ask y£>u to be specific. Who told 
9 your investigator of this situation? 
10 MR. KLEIN: May I back up and try and put this 
11 in context? 
12 THE COURT: Of course you can back up. But I am 
13 going to want an answer to the question. You're welcome to 
14 approach it any way you wish to. 
15 MR. KLEIN: A little less than two years ago 
16 this very issue came up in connection with some investigative 
17 demands we had issued in connection with an investigation of 
18 some radio stations in Vernal and the judge in the trial 
19 court there had quashed our request — our civil 
20 investigative demand, and as part of that demand we had 
21 supplied an affidavit to the investigator. 
22 THE COURT: That involved the same entity? 
23 MR. KLEIN: Same entity, no. 
24 THE COURT: So what's the nexus? Why are you 
25 bringing that up? 
1 MR. KLEIN: Because the judge quashed our 
2 investigative demands and the Utah Supreme Court issued a 
3 ruling in 1998 saying that in a — an inquiry such as this 
4 there are really only two questions for the trial court to 
5 address. One is whether or not the State has reasonable cause 
6 to conduct an investigation to believe that somebody's 
7 violating the law. Not that Mr. Whitney's clients are 
8 violating the law but somebody's violating the law. 
9 And the second question is then whether Mr. 
10 Whitney's clients have information that will be relevant to 
11 that investigation. 
12 THE COURT: That doesn't make him a target 
13 involving that information. 
14 MR. KLEIN: I agree. And we included that 
15 language intending to try and do a favor to them to put them 
16 on notice that if the information they provided us indicated 
17 that they were engaging in the kind of conduct we were 
18 investigating, we wanted them to be aware of that before they 
19 provided us the information. It does not reflect a judgment 
20 on our part that they've engaged in the violation, simply 
21 that they are — that if they are engaged in this — 
22 THE COURT: You mean you send out notice to 
23 people and say they're a "target" as a favor to them when 
24 they're not a target? 
25 MR. KLEIN: Yes, Your Honor, we do. 
THE COURT: Well, I think that's appalling. 
MR. KLEIN: Okay. 
THE COURT: To suggest to someone in writing 
that they are a target of an investigation which puts them in 
a completely different legal posture when you know that is 
not the case seems inappropriate to me. Can you explain to me 
why you do that? 
MR. KLEIN: Yes, Your Honor. We — we're 
following that course because it is the course that must be 
used when you're requesting information. Certainly in a 
criminal context for a grand jury witness they must be told 
that. 
THE COURT: Oh, wait a minute. Not unless they 
are a target. In a criminal case you never identify someone 
as a target of an investigation unless that's exactly what 
they are. 
MR. KLEIN: In — and in the procedure for the 
issuance of criminal subpoenas that statute requires you for 
issuance of a subpoena you identify whether the person is a 
target or is not. You have to do one or the other. 
THE COURT: With voracity. In other words you 
don't just say they're a target if they're not. 
MR. KLEIN: And, Your Honor, I'm happy to 
reissue the CID and strike that sentence to do that. 
THE COURT: I'm still not clear on why you did 
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it. Could you explain that to me? 
MR. KLEIN: I will certainly try. We — from our 
point of view we thought that as a firm tries to decide — as 
a firm prepares its response that if they recognize that if 
they — the information they give us indicates they're 
engaged in the type of conduct that we're investigating 
others for that they may — may Well want to retain counsel 
or may want to carefully consider the information they give 
us so that they can assert any defenses. They may claim some 
exemption or they may claim privileges so that they're not 
going to give us information and then later on when we say, 
well, thank you for the information. Based on what you've 
given us we are now planning to bring an enforcement action, 
that they're not going to claim that they were surprised. 
THE COURT: Do you know what the term target of 
an investigation means? 
MR. KLEIN: 
was that they could — 
THE COURT: 
From our point of view what we meant 
No, not from from your point of view 
but in general do you know what target of an investigation 
means? 
It means that the person is — 
Has been honed in on as a suspect. 
Is suspected of violating the law. 
So instead of sending the letter 
MR. KLEIN: 
THE COURT: 
MR. KLEIN: 
THE COURT: 
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advising Brixen & Christopher that they had the right to hire 
an attorney, that what they said had significance, instead of 
doing that you said you are a target or the target of an 
investigation. Is that the gist of it? 
MR. KLEIN: Yes. You're a target. 
THE COURT: All right. I see. So, then can you 
explain to me why? 
MR. KLEIN: The statute requires that when we 
issue a CID we include in that demand a list of notices 
warning — and the statute provides that we must notify them 
that they have the right to counsel, that any documents that 
they supply to us can be used against them in a civil and 
criminal — 
THE COURT: You've already covered the manner in 
which that information can be conveyed without putting 
someone on notice that they're the target of an investigation 
when they're not. Before you were going to tell me what facts 
you were relying on provided by whom that led you to issue 
the investigative demand. 
MR. KLEIN: Let me make sure that I'm going to 
be able to answer the question that Your Honor wants. The 
investigation started in Iron County and has now expanded to 
be a State wide investigation and it's only the expansion 
that has raised the question of Brixen & Christopher's 
involvement. So would you like me to explain why we are — 
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1 THE COURT: I'd like to know who stated to you 
2 that Brixen & Christopher was involved and what they stated 
3 Brixen & Christopher had done that caused you to conclude 
4 that they had engaged in this conduct. In other words why 
5 we're here? 
6 MR. KLEIN: Okay. We have interviewed several — 
7 excuse me, architectural firms in Salt Lake who had confirmed 
8 to us that — we've issued some CID's to — to about 20 firms 
9 to — all but this one have provided information and we've 
10 interviewed several architectural firms and in two of those 
11 meetings they have informed us that there are no independent 
12 spec writers in Utah and therefore any architectural firm 
13 that uses an outside consultant to write specs, that outside 
14 consultant is going to be affiliated with either the 
15 manufacturer or a distributor. And as — . 
16 THE COURT: So no one has told you that Brixen & 
17 Christopher has done anything wrong. 
18 MR. KLEIN: Correct. 
19 THE COURT: They've just told you — they being 
20 an unidentified group of people. You still haven't given me 
21 any names. That when independent specs are given or whatever, 
22 that's a bad sign. Is that what it boils down to? Or is there 
23 more? 
24 MR. KLEIN: There -- there is — there is a lot 
25 more. 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. That's why we're here. So 
far I have to tell you, counsel, I'm extremely unimpressed. 
MR. KLEIN: I can tell, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It seems to me that what we've got 
is a situation where we're dragging a company through the 
dirt and basically I'm sure the individuals who are 
affiliated with the company are! scarred to death and I 
haven't heard one thing indicating whether there was any 
wrongdoing that would lead you to tell them and conclude that 
they're a target. 
MR. KLEIN: The two points that the Supreme 
Court said that — • 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. KLEIN: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm not interested in the case law. 
I understand the case law. What I'm interested in — let me 
try again. What I'm interested in, sir, is specifics. Who 
told you what that led you to these concerns. 
MR. KLEIN: Representatives of EFT Architects? 
THE COURT: Who? 
MR. KLEIN: May I consult with my investigator? 
THE COURT: Oh, of course. Take whatever time 
you need. And I'm going to know — want to know exactly what 
they said about the plaintiff in this action. 
MR. KLEIN: The original complaint was brought 
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1 to our attention by a competing door hardware distributor by 
2 the name of Bill Bolton. 
3 THE COURT: B-o-u-l-t-o-n? 
4 THE INVESTIGATOR: B-o-l-t-o-n. 
5 THE COURT: All right. So a competitor called 
6 the A.G.fs office, is that correct? 
7 MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: And what did Mr. Bolton have to 
9 say? 
10 MR. KLEIN: Told us that when he was attempting 
11 to supply some door hardware to Iron County that the specs — 
12 the specifications that had been drafted were drafted in a 
13 way to favor only one manufacturer and he could not even get 
14 his products qualified for. 
15 THE COURT: How could he make that assessment? 
16 MR. KLEIN: Because the specifications specified 
17 — sorry — the specifications stated that only products 
18 made by this manufacturer were qualified to be bid. 
19 THE COURT: Do you have that document with you? 
20 MR. KLEIN: I do not have it with me. 
21 THE COURT: Have you ever seen it? 
22 MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Why wouldn't you have brought it 
24 today? 
25 MR. KLEIN: Part of the concern is that we are 
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reluctant — or concerned about publicizing the components of 
an investigation that we are still hoping to maintain 
confidential. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let me explain how I see 
this. 
MR. KLEIN: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I understand your concern. But 
just as the State has an interest here and their interest is 
in gathering data and in keeping this confidential, the 
plaintiffs have an interest, too, in being free from improper 
notice and orders that to an ordinary citizen are 
extraordinarily frightening and inappropriate unless they are 
founded on facts. And so far I haven't heard any facts that 
would warrant this. 
What I have heard is information that would cause 
the A.G.'s office, for example, to call counsel for Brixen & 
Christopher and discuss it with them. Ask to have their 
clients come in perhaps. But I see nothing here that leads to 
a civil investigative demand. 
And I'm well aware that you haven't had a chance 
to say all that you wish to say and I'm going to give you 
that opportunity. But we're balancing the rights of the State 
and the State is like this huge bus that is just running down 
the road as fast as it can go and knocking things out of the 
way as it goes. And what we've got on the other side are some 
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1 individuals. And that's not exactly equitable. 
2 And the State has a very important responsibility 
3 to not abuse its power. I don't know whether it was abused in 
4 this case. That's what I'm here to find out. And so I'm aware 
5 of what the government is trying to do and it's a laudable 
6 objective but it may be the wrong, quote, target. And even if 
7 it's the correct entity to talk Ito, the approach may be 
8 totally wrong. 
9 So after this Bolton who you acknowledge was a 
10 competitor — right there we've got an issue of credibility 
11 I would think — determines and says and apparently there's 
12 some document which we haven't seen that — specs on I guess 
13 door knobs and door bars and things like that were created in 
14 a manner to only allow equipment made by Brixen & 
15 Christopher, is that the idea? 
16 MR. KLEIN: No, there is a manufacturer. Brixen 
17 & Christopher is the architect. There's equipment made by a 
18 certain manufacturer. 
19 THE COURT: What does that have to do with 
20 Brixen & Christopher? 
21 MR. KLEIN: As we talked to the Iron County 
22 School District they told us — they provided us with copies 
23 of the specifications and we asked them, showed them the 
24 specification. Said it's written only for products of this 
25 company, this manufacturer. Is that something that you 
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1 requested the architect to specify only that manufacturer or 
2 was that something the architect did? The school district 
3 told — purchasing official told us that that was a decision 
4 made by the architect because they relied on the architect to 
5 provide them with the specifications. So — 
6 THE COURT: All right. Let's assume for the 
7 sake of argument that you can prove all that you've just 
8 said. And that the architect here, the plaintiff, did specify 
9 that certain hardware be used and that it was only made by a 
10 certain company. What's wrong with that if it's the best? 
11 Where did they do something criminal? 
12 MR. KLEIN: Number one, this is a civil 
13 investigation. This is not a criminal case. 
14 THE COURT: Where did they do something wrong? 
15 MR. KLEIN: If the architect has received 
16 benefits from the manufacturer. 
17 THE COURT: That's what I'm getting at. Where 
18 is the benefit? 
19 MR. KLEIN: Okay. The architects are paid a fee 
20 by the school district or by the other public entities to 
21 prepare the plans for the public building. 
22 THE COURT: Right. 
23 MR. KLEIN: Included among that are plans to 
24 create the specifications for the bid and then other duties 
25 during the construction. 
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1 THE COURT: Do you have anything to suggest that 
2 they were paid differentially? That they were paid more, for 
3 example, because of the recommendation or reference to 
4 certain hardware? 
5 MR. KLEIN: No. What — what our indication is 
6 that they're paid a fee and some of that fee is to provide 
7 specifications. The architects then go up and get the 
8 manufacturer to come in, write the specifications for free. 
9 The architect then gets to keep the money that would have 
10 spent drafting the specifications. They then deliver to a 
11 school district specifications that are in favor of one 
12 manufacturer implicitly telling the school district that this 
13 — that we — this is the best thing for the school district 
14 and not realizing in many cases in fact we think the 
15 architects don't even realize that the manufacturer, if they 
16 — if the manufacturer can get specifications written to 
17 favor only his products the prices are 40 percent higher than 
18 if the specifications allow other products to be bid. 
19 THE COURT: Do you have any information to 
20 suggest that an economic benefit was derived by the 
21 Plaintiff? 
22 MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: What is that information? 
24 MR. KLEIN: If an architect — architect is paid 
25 to do certain tasks of work for — one of those tasks for 
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1 which they were paid they did not provide the* work, someone 
2 else came in representing a manufacturer, did the work for 
3 them, the architect received the money, did not do the work 
4 and delivered to the school district a product that bent that 
5 — benefited the manufacturer and cost the school district 
6 higher money. 
7 THE COURT: Where do you get this information? 
8 MR. KLEIN: We have J— we have interviewed 
9 several architects who told us that there are no independent 
10 spec writers and if any — that most everybody uses outside 
11 consultants to write the specs because door hardware can be 
12 complex. 
13 THE COURT: So that's exactly what these people 
14 did, right? They used somebody from outside to write the 
15 specs? 
16 MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. KLEIN: And we've talked to people 
19 knowledgeable about this company's practices including some 
20 of its distributors who tell us that if the spec is written 
21 so that only the — that company's — that mcinuf acturer' s 
22 product is allowed then the — the price to the distributor 
23 to bid to the school is at a normal wholesale price. If on 
24 the other hand the spec is written in a way that two or more 
25 products will qualify then the wholesale price is as much as 
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1 4 0 percent less than the normal price. 
2 And, so, by — by having a spec that allows 
3 competition the price to the school district can be as much 
4 as 4 0 percent lower than what they are paying. 
5 THE COURT: Do you have anything to show me that 
6 supports what you've just stated? 
7 MR. KLEIN: I can put my investigator on the 
8 stand and he can tell you about the discussions he's had 
9 with — 
10 THE COURT: No. I meant in documents. This must 
11 be in some form of a document isn't it, sir? 
12 MR. KLEIN: Yes. Every time the investigator 
13 conducts an interview he makes notes of those interviews. 
14 THE COURT: But you don't have any documents 
15 that show this. The specs, for example, on the architectural 
16 renderings? You don't have those? 
17 MR. KLEIN: Yes, we have — yes, we have specs. 
18 We — we are reluctant — I mean, part of the reason we've 
19 not brought those forward is we don't want to be identifying 
20 certain projects and casting dispersions that anybody 
21 involved in that project is acting improperly or is suspected 
22 of collusion. 
23 THE COURT: Do you recognize you've already cast 
24 dispersions? That that's why we're here? That Brixen & 
25 Christopher is the subject of your dispersions? 
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1 Now perhaps there's enough that you've got that 
2 supports this but so far I've heard about a man named Bolton 
3 who's a competitor and that's all I've heard and I've seen no 
4 document to support what this individual told you. Do you 
5 have anything else? 
6 MR. KLEIN: We have filed the affidavit of the 
7 investigator describing what he's found but we've not 
8 attached to that each of the specifications or summaries of 
9 the interviews. 
10 THE COURT: Do you have anything else you'd like 
11 to tell me at this point? The investigator was Myron 
12 Richardson? 
13 MR. KLEIN: No, Your Honor, the investigator — 
14 THE COURT: Who is the investigator? 
15 MR. KLEIN: Del Mortensen. His affidavit's 
16 attached to our answer and memorandum. 
17 I would like to say one more thing if I may. 
18 THE COURT: You may say anything you wish. 
19 MR. KLEIN: If I can get Your Honor to turn to 
2 0 the affidavit of Mr. Richardson that was — 
21 THE COURT: I'm looking at it. 
22 MR. KLEIN: By petitioner and on page 15 of the 
23 attachment to his affidavit. 
24 THE COURT: Page 15 of his attachment? 
25 MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
22 
1 THE COURT: There is no attachment to the 
2 affidavit. There are eleven pages that comprise the 
3 affidavit. 
4 MR. KLEIN: Eleven pages constitutes the 
5 attorney's memorandum and attached to that should be marked 
6 affidavit of Richardson. 
7 THE COURT: I guess I'm looking at Del 
8 Mortensen. 
9 MR. KLEIN: I'm sorry. I'd like to go back to 
10 the affidavit of Mr. Richardson. 
11 THE COURT: All right. I have that in front of 
12 me. 
13 MR. KLEIN: Page 15. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. KLEIN: This is a — the contract DFCM has 
16 with architects including Brixen & Christopher. At the top of 
17 that page we have 12.2. And which says the architect agrees 
18 not to use sales or agent consultants especially if they're 
19 going to benefit financially either directly or indirectly 
20 from the sale or use of any product. 
21 The next paragraph also prohibits architects from 
22 using any consultants unless prior permission has been 
23 obtained from DFCM. Which is Division of Facilities and 
24 Construction Management. 
25 And because Brixen & Christopher has been engaged 
23 
1 as an architect, has designed State buildings as well, we 
2 believe for school districts if they abuse outside 
3 consultants and they've not obtained — gotten permission 
4 from DFCM or the school district, or the consultants they 
5 have used have been ones that are affiliated with a 
6 manufacturer or distributor, then we have a conflict of 
7 interest and that conflict of interest is resulting in higher 
8 prices to the school district or to DFCM. 
9 THE COURT: I guess what I'm saying visually is 
10 this line, and the line leads from this point to this point 
11 and then there's this huge empty area where there is no line 
12 and you have no nexus between this point and the terminus 
13 which involves Brixen & Christopher. Am I missing something? 
14 MR. KLEIN: The nexus that we have is that to 
15 get over that gulf, that gap, is that other architects and 
16 distributors and the manufacturer's representatives 
17 themselves have told us that — that in most cases architects 
18 will use outside consultants to — to write these door 
19 hardware specs. And that there are no independent outside 
20 consultants in Utah. So if a firm uses outside consultants 
21 they have no choice but to use the ones affiliated with 
22 manufacturers or distributors. 
23 In addition DFCM has told us that Brixen & 
24 Christopher does a fair amount of work for the State. 
25 THE COURT: So you've got Brixen & Christopher 
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1 working a lot for the State. You've got them using outside 
2 consultants. And you've got some competitor who's obviously 
3 got at least one good argument, axe to grind, who said the 
4 specs that are on their architectural plans are made to allow 
5 only a certain type of hardware. Is that about as good as it 
6 gets? 
7 MR. KLEIN: No, Your Honor, but I'm not going to 
8 argue with you. 
9 THE COURT: Well, no. I want to know. Is there 
10 more information? 
11 MR. KLEIN: Well, in the case of the complaint 
12 by the competitor we went to the school district. We looked 
13 at the specifications and saw that they did in fact favor 
14 only one product. We went to the owner of the building, the 
15 school district, and asked, is this a limitation that you 
16 requested and their answer was no. We then asked the 
17 architect whether or not the architect had created it for — 
18 had requested the building owner. The architect said no. In 
19 fact they've used, I believe, an outside consultant. 
20 We then have talked to all three distributors in 
21 Utah, of this manufacturer. We've talked to the sale — 
22 district manager for this manufacturer, to one of the spec 
23 writers, one of the employees of this company who does 
24 nothing but go out and write specs for architects and they 
25 have confirmed for us the — of how this operates. They 
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provide this free service to architects and confirmed to us 
that the price is lower if they succeed in getting — 
THE COURT: And they have not been used by this 
architectural firm? Is that what you're saying? 
MR. KLEIN: These spec writers? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. KLEIN: The spec writer has been used. Well, 
we believe this spec writer has 'been used by Brixen & 
Christopher. 
THE COURT: Well, have they or have they not? I 
mean, I thought your case was predicated upon the fact that 
they had not been using independent people to operate it for 
free. 
MR. KLEIN: The spec writers I'm talking about 
are the ones employed by this manufacturer. They are — 
they're employees of this company whose job it is to write 
specs to make sure their company's products are sold. So it's 
not an independent one. It's an outside consultant. I'm 
sorry if I misspoke. 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Whitney. 
MR. WHITNEY: Your Honor, I'd like to ask Mr. 
Klein, this architect that you're talking about in Iron 
County, that was not Brixen & Christopher, was it? 
MR. KLEIN: Correct'. It was not. 
THE COURT: Anything else you'd like to say, 
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1 sir. 
2 MR. KLEIN: No, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Whitney, I'm happy to 
4 hear from you again. 
5 MR. WHITNEY: Well, the first point I wanted to 
6 make was that — Your Honor is right that what they — what 
7 the State is asserting is what they believe to be a course of 
8 conduct of architects which they think may lead to abuse. 
9 They think that if the architects employ these — what they 
10 refer to as spec writers that it's important that they not do 
11 so. I would like to explain to the court, I don't mean to 
12 belabor this but specifications are really a technical 
13 requirement of a given product. 
14 What these advisors do is they provide what's 
15 called a schedule. The schedule lists the items that would 
16 fill — fulfill the specifications. So it's — in a 
17 simplistic way it's as though you needed a faucet for your 
18 sink and you went down to the plumbing store and asked the 
19 plumbing store what they had to sell you that fit your 
2 0 requirement for your sink. 
21 Now that's a over simplistic way but the State, I 
22 think, confuses spec writers with schedule writers. And an 
23 architect when he writes his own specifications, he then goes 
24 to a distributor or somebody that will provide the materials 
25 and then he makes up his own mind what he's going to buy from 
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1 those. But there's no inference that can be drawn from the 
2 fact that he goes to the distributor and seeks the 
3 distributor's assistance in preparing the schedules that he's 
4 thereby in collusion with and has engaged in a conspiracy to 
5 restrain the trade of the door hardware proceedings. 
6 Now, with respect to the particular item here, 
7 what Mr. Klein has told you is that the arrangement with the 
8 Iron County School District raised a suspicion in the State's 
9 mind that there was something going on that was improper. 
10 Apparently in that case the manufacturer had advised the 
11 architect to use the manufacturer's product. But that doesn't 
12 mean that that applies across the board to everybody. 
13 And as Your Honor said to Mr. Klein being charged 
14 as a target in an investigation without any information to 
15 show that there was in fact some kind of a collusive 
16 arrangement that Brixen & Christopher entered into is — is a 
17 stretch that I don't think is justified. I don't think the 
18 affidavit justifies it. And it is — there are no specific 
19 instances contained in the affidavit and I would hope that 
20 you would grant our petition. 
21 I would like to say with respect to the paragraphs 
22 in the DFCM contract about consultants. The consultants there 
23 — that's on page 15, paragraph 12.2.2 talks about — says 
24 consultants must be licensed for the professional practice 
25 used on the project and be approved in advance by the owner. 
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What that means, they're talking about structural 
consultants, electrical, mechanical, those kinds of people 
who are paid by the architect. But then they don't sell the 
product that they recommend to the contractor. They are 
advising the architect what spes — what information should 
be included in the project manual. So a consultant in the 
mind of an architect is a professional person who provides 
professional advice. 
The sales or agent consultants — that's a 
misnomer and I think that the architects do not use sales or 
agent consultants. They go to distributors primarily to get 
information about what products are available to meet the 
specifications that the architect has written. 
Unless you have some questions I think I — 
THE COURT: I don't. Thank you, counsel. I 
interrupted you with a number of different questions, Mr. 
Klein, so I'm going to let you have the last word if you'd 
like to speak to any of these issues. 
MR. KLEIN: Well, I want to ask Your Honor, I 
mean, I would be inclined to talk about the Supreme Court 
decision, what the standard is and argue why we met that 
standard. 
THE COURT: You're welcome to do so. 
MR. KLEIN: In Evans versus State, which is 963 
P.2d, 177, on page 182 the Supreme Court said, talking about 
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whether or not a civil investigative demand should be 
enforced, says," Decision is relatively uncomplicated and 
does not involve extensive weighing or testing of evidence or 
any resolution of conflicts on the evidence. The question at 
hearing is not whether the State's information is true or 
uncontradicted but whether, assuming its accuracy, the State 
has in its possession sufficient information to satisfy the 
judge that it is reasonable to believe that there has been a 
violation of the act." 
Following the page the court says," The statute, 
therefore, gives the State broad discretion to investigate 
possible antitrust violations while at the same time 
protecting the citizens from investigation is not supported 
by reasonable cause." 
And the affidavit in this case is indeed more — 
in many ways more extensive than the affidavit that was 
affirmed by the court as adequate in a prior case. 
And Mr. Whitney says that — that the affidavit 
does not have — have actual objective or specific 
information. And it does. Talks about how limits were placed 
on a project in southern Utah. Similar problems have been 
found elsewhere in Utah public schools. Priced competition is 
being suppressed in Utah for public bidding of door 
hardware. The owner relies on the architects to have 
expertise and be objective. Compensation, that the tendency 
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to use outside spec consultants that there are no independent 
spec writers, that architects generally — 
THE COURT: (Inaudible.) Compensation. You keep 
saying that but you don't say where you get this information. 
Or what the compensation consists of. 
MR. KLEIN: The compensation consists of a set 
fee that's paid by the public entity, DFCM or the school 
district. 
THE COURT: And what information, if any, do you 
have that that occurred in this case. 
MR. KLEIN: We have information from DFCM school 
districts that they have hired — 
THE COURT: No, that's not a person. You're 
saying the school talked to you. Who at the school? 
MR. KLEIN: We have interviewed Randy Haslam 
who's director of new construction and purchasing for Jordan 
School District. We have spoken with Mr. Byfield who is 
administrator of the division of — DFCM, Division of 
Facilities and Construction Management for the State. His 
attorney Alan Backman. 
THE COURT: And what have they told you about 
the money? 
MR. KLEIN: That — that a set fee is paid to 
architects for all of the duties that the architects are to 
perform in connection with building a public building. And a 
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1 portion of that fee is to compensate the architect for 
2 drafting specifications that will be used in the bid for 
3 contractors to then supply door hardware to the public 
4 building. And that — and so the architects are paid by the 
5 school district, or DFCM, to prepare specifications that are 
6 going to be — yield the best product at the lowest price to 
7 the school district or to the State. 
8 THE COURT: So that's standard procedure? 
9 MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: I thought we were talking about some 
11 irregularity in government here. 
12 MR. KLEIN: The irregularity is that architects 
13 having received that portion of the fee that is for the 
14 drafting of specifications related to door hcirdware, take 
15 that money and instead have someone else write the 
16 specifications for free. Somebody else will come in and 
17 provide that service for free and so this is many hours of 
18 work that the architects are being paid for, does not have to 
19 do, because the manufacturer's rep will come in and do that 
20 work for them. 
21 THE COURT: He's the consultant? 
22 MR. KLEIN: The outside consultant who is 
23 employed by the manufacturer. And then the specs end up 
24 saying only this manufacturer's products can be used. 
25 THE COURT: But you have nothing to show that 
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this assessment or determination by someone other than the 
architects who's been brought in to consult yields any 
monetary gain to the petitioner. 
MR, KLEIN: We do not allege a monetary gain 
over and above the fact he's getting paid for work he doesn't 
perform. 
THE COURT: But isn't an architect like an 
attorney in that you render a service and sometimes the 
service involves consulting with others? 
MR. KLEIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And so really what you're saying is 
not that they were paid in a way that other people aren't 
paid, they were paid for time that they were supposed to be 
spending when in point of fact they were paying — being paid 
when consultants were being used. 
MR. KLEIN: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you have any idea what we're 
talking about in terms of hours? 
MR. KLEIN: The — it takes the — Roy Smith who 
is the spec writer for this manufacturer told us that he 
spends dozens of hours on each particular project and that 
the only thing he does is provide free spec writing services 
for architects. He has no other functions, duties with the 
company. 
THE COURT: So many architects use these 
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consultants. 
MR. KLEIN: 
THE COURT: 
Yes, Your Honor. 
And these spec writers may well have 
been free as well? 
MR. KLEIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And their time may in fact have 
inured to the benefit of the project in that it saved the 
architect a huge amount of time? 
MR. KLEIN: I guess I would stop short of saying 
it inured to the benefit of the project because the architect 
is paid a fee and if the architect does not use — spends 
those hours the architect still keeps the money, does not 
repay it to the builder. 
THE COURT: But this is your standard practice 
from what you just told me. 
MR. KLEIN: It is a very common practice. 
THE COURT: So why are you singling out Brixen & 
Christopher. 
MR. KLEIN: They're not — then I have created 
a fundamental misconception to the court. 
THE COURT: You said it's a common practice. 
MR. KLEIN: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: Many architects do it. So why have 
you singled out Brixen & Christopher? 
MR. KLEIN: We have not. We issued civil 
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investigative demands for fairly comprehensive sets of 
records from two architectural firms in town. 
THE COURT: Who were they? 
MR. KLEIN: EFT Architects and FFKR Architects. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you indicate to them 
that they were targets? 
MR. KLEIN: Yes, we did. 
In addition the investigative demands we sent to 
Brixen & Christopher were — was one of 19 investigative 
demands sent to architectural firms at the same time and each 
of those had identical language. 
THE COURT: So you sent out 19? 
MR. KLEIN: Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: Of these. 
MR. KLEIN: Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: And you feel this is the best way 
for the A.G.'s office to obtain information? 
MR. KLEIN: We — given what Your Honor has said 
we're certainly going to change that practice as of today. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not the Supreme Court and 
you seem to feel that you're on solid ground with reference 
to how you're handling it. And, Mr. Klein, I've got to tell 
you that you strike me as a very bright, capable, lawyer who 
is concerned about doing the right thing. You obviously have 
a couple of investigators who look like they're also very 
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1 professional and interested in doing the right thing. So I 
2 don't want to malign anybody. I've always had the greatest 
3 respect for the A.G.'s office. 
4 But it's my perception that there are better ways 
5 of obtaining information than the way that we're using this 
6 case. 
7 MR. KLEIN: If I may address thcit, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: You may. 
9 MR. KLEIN: In this case in June of 1999 we 
10 attempted to get information informally. 
11 THE COURT: How? 
12 MR. KLEIN: We sent a questionnaire to about 25 
13 architectural firms in Salt Lake. Brixen & Christopher was 
14 one of those. And none of those firms responded to the 
15 questionnaire. And indeed we were able to obtain a copy of 
16 the letter from the Utah Chapter of the American 
17 Architectural Institute, AIA? 
18 THE COURT: I think that is AIA. 
19 MR. KLEIN: Advising the architects they should 
20 not respond to our questionnaire and thus — and they did not 
21 have to respond to the questionnaire. But it's what forced us 
22 into using the compulsory process. 
23 THE COURT: I can well understand that you are 
24 facing a difficult dilemma in trying to get information. 
25 MR. KLEIN: We did try informally. 
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1 THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that 
2 but my experience has been, for what it's worth, that until 
3 the lawyers get involved, lawyers representing the architects 
4 for example, I'm not so sure that the architects understand 
5 or take seriously the voluntary request for information. 
6 Somewhere, counsel, between that which I would 
7 call very genteel and appropriate approach that may be 
8 ignored and this running someone over with a truck approach 
9 and leading them to believe that they're the target of an 
10 investigation when in fact they're not, I think there must be 
11 some median ground, or I would hope there is, where 
12 information can be obtained by you in a way that it's not 
13 onerous for you, or unduly onerous for you or your 
14 investigators. 
15 MR. KLEIN: Or the architects. 
16 THE COURT: Or for the architects but also 
17 allows the architect to a — a citizen sort of go about their 
18 business not thinking as they go to bed if you'll excuse my 
19 language," my God, I'm the target of an investigation. 
2 0 What's going to become of me." Can you imagine what someone 
21 would feel like if they were subject to that sort of order? 
22 And I'm not faulting you because I understand why 
23 you did what you did and I'm not being critical. What I'm 
24 saying is that there needs to be some balancing. There needs 
25 to be some method for you to get the data you're entitled to 
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get so that the State can operate appropriately when 
buildings are constructed. So there isn't price gouging and 
there aren't unfair practices. 
But my sense is that to say to an individual or an 
entity or professional corporation you are the target when 
they're not, and that's what you told me that they were not, 
and certainly and I don't think you were in ciny way 
misrepresenting. I think what you were doing is trying to get 
their attention. But I think this is a flaw in the system. 
And if this has been the practice in your office, I see the 
reasons for it. But I would suggest a modification of 
practice. 
And I would suggest that what you may wish to do 
next, because I am going to grant the motion. And yet I do 
understand why the investigation has gone on and why it will 
no doubt continue. And I can understand why the investigator 
here has a legitimate concern as do you. But I would suggest 
that you meet with Mr. Whitney and that you meet with the 
other attorneys who represent the individuals, and see what 
can be hammered out. 
Maybe some kind of agreement can be reached that 
they're, quote, not a target, and that with that in mind 
they're willing to cooperate and they're willing to make a 
disclosure as to what they understand the normal practices 
are, and to help you so you can figure out what's what. So 
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1 that whatever has occurred in the past, the future will be a 
2 situation in which we can all say it works better than it did 
3 thanks to the efforts of the attorney general's office and 
4 thanks to the cooperative spirit that the architectural firms 
5 and their counsel have taken on. 
6 That would be my suggestion. Mr. Whitney, do you 
7 have a response to that? 
8 MR. KLEIN: May I make two comments, Your 
9 Honor. Two comments if I may on that. First is I'd like to 
10 think we are sensitive to the impacts on — 
11 THE COURT: Well, I believe you are. 
12 MR. KLEIN: Which is why we try to — the 
13 informal methods of gathering information and, secondly, that 
14 we do offer and in fact try to sit down with counsel for the 
15 people finding information and finding either ways of 
16 providing information we need at the least burden to them. 
17 In fact we sat down — we made the same offer to 
18 Mr. Whitney who made — that other attorneys and our office 
19 worked out for their firms and Brixen & Christopher decided 
20 that was not adequate. 
21 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Whitney has a 
22 responsibility to his client and I'm going to let him speak 
23 for himself rather than even attempt to speak for him. But 
24 I'm well aware of the act of good faith and I'm well aware 
25 you tried every method. So what I'm saying is I think we 
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1 ought to be able to figure out a way here to exchange 
2 information and satisfy the concerns of Mr. Whitney's 
3 clients. Though my guess is they're scared to death. Is that 
4 a fair statement, Mr. Whitney? 
5 MR. WHITNEY: Yes, it is. 
6 THE COURT: And also what your people and you, 
7 sir, are concerned about and that is taking care of your 
8 responsibilities to the State. And that is making sure that 
9 when buildings are built, schools and other sort of public 
10 buildings, that they're built in a cost effective, fair, 
11 appropriate manner. We're lucky to have employees who are 
12 willing to take on that responsibility. 
13 Mr. Whitney, would you be willing — 
14 MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Klein. To speak to 
16 opposing counsel? 
17 MR. WHITNEY: I would be happy to cooperate, 
18 Your Honor, and I think your procedure is a reasonable 
19 approach. And I think that I take Mr. Klein at his word that 
2 0 the procedure may follow that's not going to be pursued in 
21 the future, as of today I think he said, but I'm hopeful that 
22 we can work something out. I appreciate your — . 
23 THE COURT: And you may — you've been at this, 
24 Mr. Whitney, and I don't mean this to be degrading of you, 
25 Mr. Klein. What I'm saying is, you're youthful. You're 
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youthful in the same way I'm youthful. Old youthful. 
But Mr. Whitney has been at this longer than we 
have and may have some suggestion about how to get the 
architects' attention so that they do respond without being 
hit over the head with a club. And that last was just an 
effort at humor. 
You are a great age but Mr. Whitney, I'm not 
offending you am I, Mr. Whitney, by saying you've been at 
this long enough that you may have given this some thought? 
Mr. Klein certainly has as well and has employed a 
number of different methods but we've got to find something 
that works. Maybe just a simple subpoena In re Such and Such 
Investigation that the court issues an order on, ordering 
compliance by way of people appearing to talk and having the 
right to bring counsel and being notified that it could be 
inculpatory. 
But whatever we end up with, a vehicle that gives 
the A.G.'s office the strength they need and also protects 
folks from this belief that the sky is falling. I think it's 
going to come from putting our heads together and taking the 
expertise on both sides and discussing things. 
Anything you'd like to add, either one of you 
gentlemen? 
MR. KLEIN: I hear what Your Honor is saying and 
unfortunately we feel two constraints. One is a constraint 
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that to the extent that someone is unwilling to cooperate 
with us we are — our only choice is the second constraint 
which is if we have to use compulsory process the CID process 
is the only one permitted by statute. So it may well be that 
Your Honor's comments are good ones and they ought to be 
addressed to the legislature. But under the current statute 
that's our choice. 
THE COURT: But don't we have the process of the 
central subpoena In re Such and Such Investigation that can 
be issued by a court? I used to sign those all the time as 
presiding judge. 
MR. KLEIN: Under the antitrust act the only way 
that we can use — any time the attorney general gets 
information it's going to be — there's actually some 
specific statute authorizing the State to go out and use 
compulsory service and for antitrust investigations this is 
the only one permitted. 
THE COURT: Well, obviously it bears some 
additional thought and here's of course the other thing. If 
you have more data then of course you do have the right to do 
what you did in this case. I just don't think you were quite 
there. 
In other words as I was saying we're here. We're 
here, we're moving along. Then there's this big hole before 
we get to the end. And perhaps, you know, if we had 
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1 sufficient time it's just not in the papers that were before 
2 me that I saw it could be developed. Perhaps it still can and 
3 you may be back before me and I may be signing an order like 
4 the one I signed initially on civil investigative demand 
5 because there was more information present. 
6 But I'd like to think that there would be an 
7 alternative available to you beyond that that gives you a 
8 little bit more leeway. 
9 MR. KLEIN: I understand, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: And I also would like to think that 
11 folks are not told they're the target when they're not. At 
12 least to me, and maybe I'm thinking in terms of criminal 
13 actions, the target of an investigation has a very specific 
14 meaning and strikes terror into the hearts of most people. 
15 So, it was very nice to have met you. Very nice to 
16 see you, Mr. Whitney. I'm going to ask you to do the order if 
17 you would, sir. 
18 MR. WHITNEY: I will prepare one, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: And I'm going to informally order 
20 counsel to put their heads together and take all that legal 
21 expertise and come up with some structured plan. 
22 And, Mr. Klein, I think your comment about the 
23 legislature is a good one and I think perhaps that's one of 
24 the things we ought to look at. Not in this session, 
25 obviously, but next year. Is getting some kind of rule that 
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1 gives you more power, more clout as an order but doesn't 
2 restrict you to just one particular avenue of relief. 
3 Thank you. 
4 MR. KLEIN: Thank you. 
5 MR. WHITNEY: Thank you for your courtesy. 
6 THE COURT: Nice to see both of you. Nice to see 
7 you, counsel. Excellent job on the oral argument and the 
8 written pleadings. Counsel, you handled a lot of questions 
9 very, very adroitly. Thank you. 
10 MR. KLEIN: Thank you. Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 (Whereupon, the hearing was held in recess at 
13 3:20.) 
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6 the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
7 That I was NOT present at the foregoing court 
8 proceedings;. 
9 That the foregoing record was preserved by 
10 videotape; . 
11 That thereafter, I stenographically recorded the 
12 requested portion of the video and translated the same using 
13 computer-aided transcription, followed by a proofreading 
14 against the video. 
15 That the foregoing pages contain to the best of my 
16 ability a full, true and correct transcript of the same. 
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ADDENDUM E 
HARDIN A. WHITNEY (3456) 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-0250 
ROBERT G. WING (4445) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER 
ARCHITECTS, P.C. a Utah 
Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Defendant. : 
: ORDER GRANTING PETITION AND 
: DISMISSING CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE 
: DEMAND 
Case No. 00-0900651^ 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Plaintiff's Petition To Set Aside A Civil Investigative 
Demand came on for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on 
Thursday, March 16, 2000, at 2:00 p.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
Hardin A. Whitney of the firm of Moyle & Draper, P.C. and Defendant 
was represented by R. Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General of the 
State of Utah. 
After hearing the presentations of counsel and based upon 
the record herein, the Court being fully advised, it is 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 8 7000 
SALT LAKE COUNTX /I 
Deputy Clerk 
ooo°\o^^?\ 
HEREBY ORDERED: 
That Plaintiff's Petition To Set Aside A Civil 
Investigative Demand served on Plaintiff is granted as prayed and the 
Civil Investigative Demand is dismissed. 
DATED this / ^ day of March, 2000. 
Leslie A. Lewis, Jucfge 
Approved as to form: 
pf! Wayne Klein 
» . 
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